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Elnur Enveroglu

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The latest move by the US House Foreign Affairs Committee against Azerbaijan raises a question that Washington should be asking itself: is Congress helping to consolidate peace in the South Caucasus, or is it allowing domestic lobbying politics to reopen a conflict that the region is finally trying to leave behind?

On 22 July, the committee adopted an Armenian National Committee of America-backed amendment calling for the "immediate and unconditional release of Armenian detainees held in Azerbaijan". The vote was bipartisan, 44 to seven, and was championed by Democratic Congressman Brad Sherman with the support of Republican committee chairman Brian Mast. The measure is part of a wider campaign by ANCA and allied organisations that has pushed the issue of Armenian detainees to the centre of congressional debate.

There is nothing unusual about a diaspora organisation lobbying Congress. This is a normal part of American political life. ANCA openly campaigns on Capitol Hill, organises meetings with lawmakers, endorses candidates and mobilises supporters around elections. Its influence comes not only from lobbying but from its ability to organise politically active voters, shape congressional narratives and reward politicians who support its agenda. ANCA recently endorsed Congressman Mike Lawler for re-election, highlighting his record on Armenia and Azerbaijan, while also preparing a major pre-election mobilisation on Capitol Hill.

But there is a difference between lobbying for a cause and allowing lobbying priorities to become a substitute for foreign policy.

The central issue now is not a conventional prisoner of war exchange. That chapter of the conflict has largely ended. What remains is the fate of Armenian officials and military figures detained and prosecuted in Azerbaijan, many of whom are accused by Baku of serious crimes committed during the decades-long conflict. Their cases should be judged on the evidence and according to due process. Human rights organisations are entitled to scrutinise those proceedings. But the existence of a criminal case does not automatically turn it into an issue for political intervention by another country's legislature.

Every sovereign state has the right to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes committed on its territory. If Washington believes that a particular trial violates international standards, it should present evidence and make that case. It should also apply the same standards consistently.

That is where the debate becomes uncomfortable.

For decades, Azerbaijanis who were killed, displaced and driven from their homes during the conflict over Karabakh received far less attention in Washington than the Armenian narrative. The mass displacement of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis and allegations of serious violations during the conflict were rarely given the same political prominence in Congress. The destruction and suffering experienced by Azerbaijani communities were not simply historical footnotes. They were part of the same conflict that produced the Armenian displacement from Karabakh.

A credible human rights policy cannot be selective. If the rights of people detained in Baku deserve attention, then the victims of the crimes that Azerbaijan says they committed also deserve to be remembered. Justice cannot begin only when the defendant belongs to a politically influential constituency.

The timing of the congressional intervention is also difficult to ignore. Armenia and Azerbaijan are now attempting to move from decades of confrontation towards a formal peace settlement. The two sides have made progress, although significant disagreements remain, including over Armenia's constitutional framework and the final legal architecture of the peace process.

Against that backdrop, turning detainees into a central instrument of political pressure risks creating another obstacle to normalisation. It is possible to defend human rights without undermining diplomacy. It is also possible to criticise Azerbaijan's judicial system while recognising that criminal proceedings are fundamentally different from a prisoner of war exchange.

The Armenian diaspora has every right to advocate for its interests. But the same principle should apply to Azerbaijanis and to every other community affected by the conflict. The question for Congress is whether its policy is being shaped by an objective assessment of the region or by the most effective lobbying operation in the room.

The Trump administration has pursued a different approach, placing greater emphasis on direct diplomacy and regional connectivity. That creates an opportunity for Washington to move beyond the old politics of the conflict. The United States has a strategic interest in a stable South Caucasus, not in preserving a permanent political battlefield over the remnants of a war that has already devastated several generations.

If Armenia and Azerbaijan are serious about peace, their disputes should be resolved through negotiations, international law and, where necessary, courts. If the United States wants to be a credible mediator, it should encourage that process rather than allow congressional lobbying to become another arena in which the conflict is fought.

The real test of American diplomacy is not whether it can take sides in an old conflict. It is whether it can help both sides finally move beyond it.