Azernews.Az

Akbar Novruz

Read more

In the coming period, Armenia may find itself facing one of the most significant constitutional challenges ever since the Velvet Revolution of 2018. With Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan taking the next steps towards constitutional reform considered by many as necessary for the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and fulfillment of promises made during the peace process, the issue now is not whether the Constitution will be amended, but how. Indeed, as plausible as the ongoing process may be, the current domestic dynamics say otherwise.

Political figure in Armenia Beniamin Matevosyan argues that the process itself could become the opposition's strongest opportunity to challenge Pashinyan's rule. His assessment deserves attention, but it also rests on several assumptions that may ultimately prove less certain than they initially appear.

According to Matevosyan, the decisive moment will arrive once the government officially submits its constitutional reform package to parliament. He argues that Pashinyan, despite holding a parliamentary majority, lacks the constitutional majority required to approve amendments on his own.

In his view, it turns the parliamentary opposition into the main political player. In case all the members of the opposition reject the proposed amendments, the government may fail to achieve one of its primary political goals. According to Matevosyan, in such a situation, Pashinyan may not have any choice but to try and get a new mandate from the parliament through elections.

In such a way, the process of constitutional reform becomes much more than a mere legal procedure; it may serve as a stimulus for a political reconfiguration.

But how much of a problem could this idea possibly become?

In his assessment to AzerNEWS, political commentator Levon Ghazaryan believes that the political reality looks much more complicated than the provided argumentation:

"Matevosyan's analysis assumes that parliamentary approval represents the decisive battlefield, which could be counted as true - but to a certain extent. Armenia's legal framework offers additional avenues. Constitutional amendments could also be initiated through mechanisms involving public participation, including citizen-backed initiatives under procedures established by Armenian law. Moreover, even if parliamentary approval remains necessary at later stages, the government retains flexibility in how it structures and sequences the reform process. Equally important is the political arithmetic inside parliament itself.

Now, the final results of the elections gave the ruling Civil Contract party 64 seats in parliament, Strong Armenia 29, and the Armenia Alliance 12 seats. With this specific distribution of seats, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's party can't change the constitution or call a referendum on its own. While it may seem unlikely, the situation is closer to a near-zero probability. Pashinyan's government would need to convince at least six MPs from the opposition alliances to defect or cross party lines in order to vote in favor of holding a constitutional referendum for the public."

Despite Ghazaryan's optimism, he also acknowledges the fact that Armenia's opposition has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to obstruct government initiatives:

"Looking at Armenia's history, maintaining absolute unity has been proven difficult over time. Individual defections, tactical abstentions, or negotiated compromises cannot be ruled out, particularly if constitutional reforms become linked to broader political or institutional bargaining. Pashinyan has repeatedly accused segments of the opposition of representing entrenched political and economic elites that dominated Armenia before 2018. His government has continued legal proceedings and anti-corruption investigations involving several prominent opposition-linked figures, arguing that strengthening democratic institutions requires dismantling old patronage networks.

Critics, however, contend that some of these actions risk appearing politically selective and could deepen concerns over institutional independence. Now, with certain institutions putting pressure on the official Yerevan, this is not sustainable in the long run for a country desiring European integration. If further legal pressure fragments opposition parties or encourages individual lawmakers to distance themselves from party leadership, the government's parliamentary calculations could change considerably."

Looking beyond this point, an Armenian analyst assumes the coming constitutional debate is unlikely to follow a single predetermined script:

"Now and ultimately, with that being said, I believe that much will depend on several interconnected factors: the final content of the constitutional amendments, public opinion, the pace of Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations, internal cohesion within both the ruling Civil Contract party and the opposition, and Pashinyan's willingness to pursue compromise rather than confrontation. Right now, from an 'inside POW' I can say that things are stable. Currently, the country faces looming possibilities and discussions about its future economic state [red]. Russia's ban on Armenian products. Rather than viewing constitutional reform as an automatic trigger for political upheaval, it may be more accurate to see it as the next major test of Armenia's evolving political system."