Azernews.Az

Elnur Enveroglu

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Iranian officials have in recent days begun shifting from harsh rhetoric to a softer and more pragmatic policy regarding the Zangezur Corridor, or the TRIPP project. According to international experts, at a time when Iran’s relations with neighbouring states around the Gulf have become increasingly strained, Tehran has begun to worry about Western powers strengthening their position along its northern border, namely in the Syunik region, which is de facto part of Armenian territory. Iran, which for a period regarded the TRIPP project as a threat to official Tehran, is now, interestingly enough, beginning even to show an interest in the project, and this development has not gone unnoticed.

It should be recalled that in July this year, Iran’s Ambassador to Armenia, Khalil Shirgolami, stressed that the TRIPP project was dangerous for Iran when commenting on the initiative. Some time earlier, certain sources had even suggested that Iran could deploy a military contingent along its northern borders. However, the tensions continuing in the south, around the Gulf, have already had a significant impact on a number of changes in Iran’s foreign policy over the past two months. The point is that two months after the Iranian diplomat’s tough stance, a markedly different view was voiced in the Armenian parliament. On 9 September this year, the Armenian parliament stated that the TRIPP project did not pose any threat to official Tehran, a position also confirmed by Armenian sources. Moreover, official Tehran has informed Yerevan that it wants to establish a new free economic zone in an area close to the border with Armenia.

Tehran’s close relationship with Yerevan is not a new phenomenon. Indeed, Tehran has repeatedly sought to send unpleasant messages to official Baku over the opening of the Zangezur Corridor, both through diplomatic channels and via unofficial organisations. Iran, which once went so far as to describe the Zangezur area as its own “red line”, is now openly expressing a desire to develop common interests with Yerevan in a lower key and even in an extremely conciliatory manner. In other words, the ice is beginning to melt and Iran appears to be less concerned than before about the prospect of the United States, which it regards as its most formidable adversary in the Gulf, taking the lead in a major route along its northern borders.

In fact, looking at the current circumstances, Iran appears to have only two choices before it: A) oppose the TRIPP project, or B) accept the choice of becoming one of its participants. Iran understands very well that losing its border with Armenia could deprive it of major opportunities and could even leave it, in a sense, encircled in the face of the United States. It is true that one might ask whether the presence of the United States along Iran’s border with Armenia could really be that risky for a country that borders 13 countries, including maritime borders. The answer, in fact, would be yes. This is because Armenia has also served as a means for Iran to counter the strengthening of the Turkey-Azerbaijan tandem, which Tehran has long been unable to accept. For many years, the closure of borders effectively kept alive plans for a major trade route to be shaped primarily through Iran. However, changing realities in the region have once again demonstrated that the remapping of global trade routes is unavoidable. Iran’s North-South transport route extending as far as the Indian Ocean has failed to realise its full potential against the backdrop of conflicts in the region. The world has once again seen that diversifying alternative routes and creating secure connections have become among the fundamental requirements of the regional transport architecture. The Zangezur direction has emerged precisely as one of the important elements of this new regional reality. Even amid the current developments, Iran is seeking, through Armenia, to find a way to join this route. Naturally, Yerevan, which is eager to integrate rapidly with the European Union, is not fully taking Tehran’s interests into account on this issue, but it is trying to partially accommodate it, in other words, to send the message: “There is a place for you here too.” For now, however, the number of chairs on which Yerevan frequently changes its position is increasing. Against the backdrop of the approaching TRIPP reality, Yerevan is, quite literally, beginning to attract the attention of both Russia on one side and Iran on the other. These interests could perhaps grow even further. The interests of France and Western Europe could also add to the ranks of those perhaps standing in a queue behind the project. This, in turn, could provide a new push capable of provoking even greater irritation and concern in both the north and the south.