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Ulviyya Poladova

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In just a few days, it will be one year since Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, and U.S. President Donald Trump signed the Washington Joint Declaration, a document intended to lay the foundation for a lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The declaration was widely regarded as a historic diplomatic breakthrough, raising hopes that decades of conflict in the South Caucasus could finally give way to a new era of regional stability and cooperation.

However, diplomatic signatures alone do not guarantee lasting peace. History has repeatedly demonstrated that peace agreements succeed only when accompanied by political will. Nearly one year after the declaration, optimism has been tempered by a series of unresolved political, legal, and geopolitical challenges that continue to complicate the normalization process between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The obstacle is not, at this stage, the battlefield. It is a tangle of constitutional disputes, domestic political polarization in Armenia, diaspora activism, and the residue of geopolitical ambitions that resist the logic of the post-war settlement.

Just recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that the draft of the country’s new constitution will be made public by the end of the year. Speaking about the timeline for releasing the text of the proposed fundamental law, Pashinyan said that a specific date could not yet be provided but confirmed that the draft would be published before the year’s end. Despite these commitments, no draft has been released yet, and there has been little visible progress in completing this politically sensitive process.

Besides, constitutional change in Armenia is not a simple executive act. It requires broad parliamentary support, public backing, and navigation through a polity that remains deeply divided.

From Azerbaijan's perspective, as long as these constitutional references remain in force, they create legal and political uncertainty that contradicts the spirit of a future peace treaty and could serve as grounds for renewed disputes in the future. For this reason, Azerbaijan insists that the constitutional issue must be fully resolved before the final peace agreement is signed.

Following the parliamentary elections held on June 7, Pashinyan's Civil Contract party retained a parliamentary majority with 64 seats. Nevertheless, this falls short of the two-thirds majority (70 seats) required to amend the Constitution. As a result, the government cannot implement constitutional changes unilaterally and must seek support from other political forces, many of which remain sceptical or openly opposed to constitutional reform. So, domestic political resistance remains one of the principal challenges facing the Armenian leadership.

Under Armenian law, any peace agreement must receive approval from the Constitutional Court before it can be ratified. Pashinyan has previously stated that if the Court concludes that the peace treaty contradicts the existing Constitution, he would personally initiate constitutional amendments. This creates an unusual legal and political dilemma.

Without constitutional reform, the Constitutional Court could potentially find incompatibilities between the peace treaty and the current Constitution. In such a scenario, the implementation of the agreement would become legally impossible despite the successful completion of negotiations.

A government of peace, an opposition of war?

Inside Armenia, the peace-versus-war divide has become the central cleavage of national politics. This framing has been articulated most clearly by Alen Simonyan, the former parliament speaker and a close Pashinyan ally, who has argued that the 2026 elections will present voters with a stark choice "between peace and possible war".

Opposition parties and various political movements continue to criticize many aspects of the government's approach toward Azerbaijan.

Armenia's political opposition remains firmly opposed to the current framework of the peace process with Azerbaijan. Opposition parties have repeatedly accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of pursuing a policy of capitulation, making unilateral concessions, and undermining Armenia's national security. These accusations have fueled domestic political polarization and complicated the government's efforts to advance normalization with Azerbaijan.

Another factor frequently discussed by regional policymakers is the influence of Armenian diaspora organizations.

History teaches is that the Armenian lobby and its supporters in Western institutions have long served as obstacles to peace. Back in 1992, the infamous Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act denied aid to Azerbaijan, emboldening Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani lands and prolonging a bloody war. Now, decades later, the same forces are at play, desperate to reverse the irreversible: Azerbaijan’s restoration of its territorial integrity.

Armenian diaspora organizations, flush with funds and steeped in revisionist fantasies, continue to drive Yerevan into confrontational policies. Rather than building bridges or investing in Armenia’s development, the diaspora has consistently pushed for militarization and intransigence.

The reality is that diaspora organizations, like many transnational advocacy networks worldwide, are capable of influencing public debate and foreign policy discussions. Their impact on the peace process therefore remains a subject of continuing political debate rather than settled consensus.

This matters for the peace document because a treaty is only as durable as the political consensus behind it. If a signed agreement is perceived by nearly half the Armenian electorate as a capitulation imposed under duress, it will be vulnerable to revision the moment the political winds shift. Azerbaijan's demand for constitutional guarantees is, in this sense, a recognition of the same problem from the other side. Without a domestic Armenian consensus in favor of peace, ink on paper may not be enough.

A peace document cannot be divorced from the regional geometry in which it sits. One of the sharpest points of contention remains Azerbaijan's push for the so-called Zangezur Corridor - an extraterritorial transport link through Armenian territory connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.

Despite political disagreements, economics provides one of the strongest arguments in favor of lasting peace. Improved regional connectivity could create new transportation routes linking the South Caucasus with Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Expanded trade, infrastructure investment, and cross-border commerce could generate significant economic benefits for both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Business communities generally favor predictability over instability. Investors are considerably more likely to commit long-term capital when regional security risks decline. For this reason, a peace agreement could reshape not only bilateral relations but also the broader economic architecture of the South Caucasus.

Nearly one year after the Washington Joint Declaration, the foundations for peace undoubtedly appear stronger than they did only a few years ago. Nevertheless, important obstacles remain.

Questions surrounding constitutional reform in Armenia or domestic political polarization continue to influence the pace of normalization.

The success or failure of this peace process will ultimately depend not on the symbolism of diplomatic ceremonies, but on the consistent fulfillment of commitments and Armenia's recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.