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Ulviyya Poladova

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Armenia stands once again at a crossroads in its foreign policy, with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan trying to balance between its traditional ally, Russia, and a growing political and economic pull from the European Union and the United States. However, as geopolitical tensions rise and Moscow’s patience thins, Yerevan’s strategy is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.

Since coming to power in 2018 after the "Velvet Revolution," Pashinyan has attempted to recalibrate Armenia’s foreign policy without provoking direct confrontation with Moscow. Yerevan remains a member of Russian-led institutions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), yet it has shown increasing interest in deepening ties with the European Union through the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), signed in 2017.

The EU has become Armenia’s largest donor and trading partner, and Brussels recently pledged hundreds of millions of euros in economic and institutional assistance.

For decades, Armenia relied heavily on Russia as its principal security guarantor. Moscow maintained military presence in the country, controlled major sectors of Armenia’s energy infrastructure, and acted as Yerevan’s primary strategic partner. Yet, walking this tightrope is becoming harder as Armenia grows frustrated with Moscow’s waning security support, particularly after the 2020 Karabakh war and Azerbaijan’s victory.

Moscow’s attitude toward Pashinyan’s foreign policy has evolved from cautious tolerance to visible irritation. Initially, Russia viewed Armenia’s overtures to Europe as manageable so long as Yerevan remained within its formal security and economic blocs. But in recent years, Russia has grown increasingly alarmed by Armenia’s rhetoric questioning the CSTO’s reliability and by symbolic gestures of distancing - including Pashinyan’s decision not to attend CSTO summits and his open criticism of Russia’s failure to defend Armenian security interests.

Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev recently argued that it was necessary to recognize that Pashinyan appears intent on undermining relations between Moscow and Yerevan. According to Medvedev, "authority in the West" has become more important for the Armenian prime minister than maintaining strong ties with Russia.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Western countries are trying to "pull away" Russia’s allies, especially neighboring states, from Moscow’s sphere of influence.

These statements demonstrate growing concern within Russian political circles that Armenia may gradually shift toward a Western geopolitical orientation.

For Pashinyan, the lesson was clear: dependence on a single ally can no longer ensure Armenia’s safety. His administration seeks to replace exclusive reliance on Russia with a web of diversified partnerships. Yerevan has intensified military cooperation with France and the EU, and expanded political dialogue with the United States. The Armenian Prime Minister has come under increasing criticism during the election campaign after adopting a noticeably harsher tone toward political opponents and dissatisfied voters. Pashinyan has openly resorted to threats against critics and engaged in direct verbal confrontations with citizens during campaign appearances.

During several regional visits, he reportedly reacted sharply to voters who raised uncomfortable questions.

It is in this charged environment that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is scheduled to visit Yerevan on May 26. Later, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan stated that there is no connection between the planned visit of U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Yerevan on May 26 and the country’s upcoming parliamentary elections. But there’s no smoke without fire.

Yerevan insists that Rubio’s visit is focused on regional security and bilateral cooperation, not internal politics.

Armenia’s opposition, especially the Republican Party and figures linked to former presidents Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, argue that Pashinyan’s Western tilt is reckless.

Moscow could retaliate through economic restrictions, energy price increases, or tighter border controls. Russian Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov has already said that a preferential price for Russian gas for Armenia could be formed on a market basis if Yerevan decides to withdraw from the Eurasian Economic Union.

Russia remains deeply embedded in Armenia’s economy. Millions of Armenians work in Russia, remittances play a major role in the Armenian economy, and critical sectors, including energy and transportation, still depend heavily on Russian infrastructure and investment.

If Armenia loses Moscow’s trust without securing firm Western guarantees, it risks being left in a geopolitical void.

While Armenia debates its orientation, Azerbaijan’s power continues to grow.

Baku has significantly strengthened its geopolitical position through energy diplomacy, strategic transport initiatives, and expanding partnerships with regional and global actors. Azerbaijan maintains active cooperation simultaneously with Türkiye, Russia, the European Union, Central Asia, and increasingly China.

This multi-vector diplomacy has allowed Azerbaijan to emerge as one of the key strategic players in the South Caucasus.

Armenia’s internal political tensions and foreign policy ambiguity risk widening the regional balance gap even further.

The coming months may therefore prove decisive not only for Armenia’s domestic political future, but also for the broader geopolitical architecture of the South Caucasus.