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Akbar Novruz

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Wednesday, April 16th, was a busy day in Brussels. One room saw discussions between a high-level delegation from Azerbaijan and representatives of the European External Action Service in connection with negotiating a new partnership agreement with Azerbaijan. Another room saw a vote on resolutions by Belgian and Dutch parliaments to insist on the immediate release of the Armenian prisoners held by Azerbaijan and withdrawal from Armenia. Four days after this incident, Azerbaijan called in the ambassadors of Belgium and the Netherlands to its capital, Baku. This was not surprising. It was, to say the least, an interesting time for this kind of activity.

The events of April 16 are by no means an exception. This is what the typical functioning of the European foreign policy vis-a-vis Azerbaijan looks like. The strategy of engagement and criticism at the same time, both seemingly unaware of, or at least indifferent to, each other's existence. While Europe's executive is courting Baku as a supplier of natural gas to fill the gap left by the Russian Federation, an intermediary for transit through the Middle Corridor, and a geopolitical partner in the South Caucasus which is not aligned with Russia or Iran, the European parliament occasionally, and this time in out-dated manner, reminds both itself and Baku that the September 2023 anti-terror measures was done 'injustfyingly'.

The Belgian resolution, tabled by MP Michel de Maegd and MP Els Van Hoof, who serve as chairman and vice-chairman of the foreign affairs committee, demands the freedom of Armenian POWs, the repatriation of the Armenian population of Karabakh under international security guarantees, and the retreat of Azerbaijani troops to their positions prior to May 2021. The Dutch resolution, tabled by MP Don Seder, is largely in the same vein and also briefly addresses the recognition of the Armenian genocide, an evergreen topic which Azerbaijan does not hesitate to conflate with the issue of Karabakh in its entirety. Neither resolution carries any binding force, but both were approved, albeit not without precedent.

In the statement issued by the Azerbaijani parliament, the documents were dismissed as emanating from "the unhealthy imagination and racism of traditionally anti-Azerbaijani, Islamophobic forces." However, irrespective of what the statement is aimed at, it is unlikely that it would enhance Baku's position. The tone of the statement issued by the foreign ministry was somewhat restrained; nonetheless, it reiterated that the documents constituted a gross violation of international law, driven by "a deep-rooted prejudice against Azerbaijan." It should be noted that the ICJ had already refused to entertain the demands made by Armenia to free the arrested individuals. Besides, the UN Working Group had also concluded in March 2025 that their arrest was legal.

The timing of this resolution and its audacity are really contradictory; it passed on the very day of the bilateral meeting between the Speakers of the Armenian and Azerbaijani parliaments, an unremarked yet effective piece of diplomacy that the drafters of the resolution may have been unaware of or chosen to disregard. For his part, Pashinyan has, in recent weeks, already informed domestic audiences that dwelling on previous wrongs is inconsistent with a peace process the two governments have already agreed upon. The 2025 Washington Declaration on the normalization of relations is there. The TRIPP Corridor initiative is there. Normalization with Türkiye is there. Demands for the withdrawal of Azerbaijani troops back to pre-2021 lines, which bear no resemblance to political realities, do not seem likely to contribute to any of the above.

Of course, all this is not surprising, and it is not the first time. The European Union often overlooks certain realities in pursuit of a so-called 'neutral' position. To some extent, it's plausible to see them advocating for human rights while neglecting a fundamental principle they've historically supported: the importance of internationally recognized boundaries. The claims being made are outdated and do not reflect today's realities.

And yet. There is one significant exception regarding the peace treaty signed in Washington, and it is not the commitment of Azerbaijan to release the prisoners. In none of the declarations made at the August summit is there any mention of this issue. Should the problem of their release not be settled as part of the official peace treaty, then perhaps among the very few tools that could help solve it would be those resolutions made by European parliaments – albeit with their questionable timing, influence by diasporas, and lack of binding force. Perhaps, at the end of the day, this is a matter for the two countries to decide.

It is an argument for the difficult truth that Europe's "right hand and left hand" problem is sometimes, in the specific and narrow case of human rights accountability, deliberate rather than merely disorganised.