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Elnur Enveroglu

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The idea of a European Security Council has returned to the European Union's political agenda. For decades, the EU effectively ensured its security through the military umbrella of the United States and NATO. But recent developments have compelled Europe to think differently.

Most of all, the Russia-Ukraine war has forced the bloc to confront urgent questions about how to guarantee the security of its member states and deter future aggression. In truth, this debate is also the result of a wider governance crisis in EU foreign and security policy.

Put simply, Europe has long been an economic giant but often appears slow, fragmented and ineffective in geopolitical decision-making. The proposal for a new security body is an attempt to fill that gap.

The EU also lacks clear mechanisms to operate independently in moments of strategic confrontation. One of the principal reasons is its consensus-based system. Many major foreign policy decisions still require the unanimous approval of all 27 member states. In practice, that means a single government can delay or block action by the entire bloc.

This weakness has been repeatedly exposed in recent years. Aid packages for Ukraine have been delayed. Sanctions on Russia have taken months of negotiation. Common positions on the Middle East have proven elusive. Approaches towards China remain divided. The result is an all-too-familiar image of Europe: economic strength paired with political weakness.

For years, Europe’s security architecture rested on NATO and, above all, the United States. Yet several factors have unsettled that assumption.

Domestic political polarisation in America has raised doubts about Washington’s long-term reliability. Tensions between President Donald Trump and European leaders created visible cracks within the alliance. Many in Europe began to realise how deeply dependent they had become on American guarantees.

There is also growing uncertainty over how future US administrations may view Europe. Washington’s strategic focus has increasingly shifted towards the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s rhetoric on NATO sharpened concerns in Brussels. A once comfortable assumption has now become an urgent question: if America weakens or retreats, how will Europe defend itself?

The war in Ukraine marked a turning point. It demonstrated that the risk of large-scale war in Europe is no longer theoretical. It also exposed serious weaknesses: insufficient weapons stockpiles, a fragmented defence industry and painfully slow decision-making.

There are political divisions, too. Some member states have openly or partially resisted deeper support for Ukraine, complicating efforts to reach unanimity. Against this backdrop, many within the EU now believe that in times of crisis, it is no longer viable to wait for approval from 27 capitals. A smaller, more agile decision-making mechanism is needed.

So what might a European Security Council look like?

The concept is not unprecedented. The United Nations has its own Security Council, however imperfect. An EU version would likely include major states such as France, Germany, Italy and Poland, alongside representatives of the European Commission and the bloc’s foreign policy institutions.

Its purpose would be to accelerate decisions in emergencies, coordinate defence systems, and manage sanctions, military production and crisis missions. Initially, it may function as a mini-cabinet. In time, it could become the nucleus of a more self-reliant European security order.

Germany illustrates the wider challenge. Although it remains Europe’s foremost economic power, its military strength has long lagged behind its economic weight. Since the Cold War, Berlin has been discouraged from expanding its military power. Today, however, Germany increasingly seeks to build credible capabilities, conscious that Russia’s confrontation with Europe may one day place Berlin directly in the line of pressure.

In that sense, the Ukraine war has served as a litmus test for Europe. It revealed not only Russia’s military threat, but Europe’s own vulnerabilities. A Security Council would therefore be less an endpoint than a pivot for wider reforms.

There are political motives, too. France sees such a body as a route to greater European strategic autonomy. Germany wants to translate economic weight into political influence. Poland seeks a stronger Eastern European voice in shaping security policy.

Smaller states, however, fear exclusion.

And here lies the central dilemma: democracy or efficiency? Under the current system, everyone has a voice, but decisions are slow. Under a new model, decisions could be faster, but some countries may feel sidelined.

The EU must choose between full consensus and geopolitical effectiveness.

Whatever shape the final answer takes, one fact is now openly acknowledged in Brussels: the current system is not fit for the security challenges of the 21st century.

If American commitment weakens, Russia remains aggressive, and competition with China deepens, Europe will sooner or later be forced to build a more centralised security structure.

This institution may not emerge tomorrow, or even within a few years. But the debate itself sends a powerful signal.

Europe no longer wants to be merely a union of soft power. It wants to become a strategic power in its own right.

Photo: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik