Azernews.Az

Qabil Ashirov

Read more

At a time when the confrontation between the United States and Iran continues without any sign of easing, it is still too early to say that Washington has achieved all of its objectives. The war is ongoing, and Tehran retains the ability to resist. However, when the conflict is viewed from the perspective of Iran’s regional power, a different picture emerges. As US military pressure increases, the system of influence Iran has built across the Middle East is gradually weakening, with its various components disappearing one by one.

The confrontation between the United States and Iran did not begin today. Its foundations were laid after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Following the overthrow of the Shah’s regime, Tehran became one of Washington’s main regional rivals. Over the following decades, Iran expanded its political and military influence beyond its borders. Its ties with various political and armed groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian territories became one of the main instruments of Iranian regional policy.

The advantages this model provided Tehran were clear. Iran was able to create additional threats for the United States and its allies beyond its own territory. Instead of confronting Iran in a direct war, its opponents also had to deal with the problems created by Tehran’s proxies across the region.

However, the weaknesses of this strategy had long been debated. Iran’s economic capabilities are extremely limited compared with those of the United States. The US has one of the world’s largest economies, while Iran has far fewer economic resources because of sanctions and structural problems. The technological gap is also substantial. US capabilities in air defense, intelligence, satellite systems, aviation, precision strikes and electronic warfare significantly exceed those of Iran.

Against this backdrop, many experts argued that Iran would be better served by concentrating its resources on its own defense rather than spreading them across the region. Tehran and its supporters, however, took a different view. Their main argument was that the outcome of a war is not determined solely by economic power and technology. Willpower, long-term resistance and the ability to inflict sustained losses on the opposing side also play an important role. Based on this approach, Iran provided political, financial and military support to its regional allies, creating multiple channels of pressure against the United States.

In recent years, however, the confrontation gradually evolved into an open war. With Donald Trump’s return to power, the US-Iran confrontation reached one of its most intense phases. Washington began carrying out direct strikes against Iran’s military and economic capabilities, while Tehran responded with retaliatory attacks.

The transition to open warfare exposed a fundamental weakness in Iran’s regional strategy. The network of influence Iran had built over decades appeared powerful, but its individual components were unable to maintain their previous positions under intense military pressure.

First, Hezbollah came under heavy pressure in Lebanon. The killing of Hassan Nasrallah, who had led the group for many years, had a major impact on its structure and influence. Hezbollah also lost some of its previous weight in Lebanon’s domestic political balance.

Then came Syria. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government removed one of Iran’s most important regional pillars. For years, Syria had served as a key logistical and political link for Tehran toward Lebanon. Assad’s departure from the country significantly reduced Iran’s ability to maintain influence along that route.

Now attention has turned to Yemen.

Yemeni government forces, backed by Saudi Arabia, have launched a new offensive against the Houthis. Fighting has intensified in the provinces of Al Jawf, Taiz and Al Bayda. On September 8, the Yemeni army announced that it had recaptured the Al-Yatmah area in Al Jawf province from the Houthis. The area is located near the Saudi border and has strategic importance.

The Houthis remain a powerful force, and it is difficult to predict that they will be defeated in the near future. In fact, attacks carried out against cities and energy facilities in southern Saudi Arabia on September 8 showed that the group still retains significant strike capabilities. More than 70 people were reportedly wounded in the attacks.

However, the significance of the latest developments in Yemen extends far beyond the country itself for Iran. The Houthis are among Iran’s main remaining regional partners. If Yemeni government forces achieve their objectives and retake territory currently controlled by the Houthis, Tehran could lose an important source of influence along the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb.

As a result, Iran’s regional map of influence is undergoing a series of changes. Hezbollah has been weakened in Lebanon, Iran’s main ally in Syria has been removed from power, and Hamas has suffered heavy losses in Gaza. Now Iran’s position is also being tested on the Yemeni front.

This process could have serious political consequences inside Iran as well. Tehran has spent years presenting the network of proxy forces it built across the region as one of the main instruments of its power. The weakening of these forces and their loss of territory and influence damages the image of strength cultivated by the Iranian leadership. Tehran no longer appears as capable as before of maintaining its influence beyond its own borders. As the war continues, the economic and military costs also rise. Iran has to devote substantial financial resources to military operations, weapons and the maintenance of allied forces. This creates additional pressure on the government at a time when the country is already facing economic difficulties.

For this reason, the developments on the Yemeni front should be seen as part of a much broader process. The Houthis currently occupy an important position in Iran’s regional strategy. If Yemeni government forces succeed in retaking territory under Houthi control, Tehran will lose another important regional pillar. This would weaken Iran’s influence along the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb and increase Washington’s strategic pressure on Tehran.

This could become one of the war’s most serious consequences for Iran. Even if the United States does not defeat Iran directly, it can gradually dismantle the regional defensive network Tehran has built around itself. As Iran’s regional influence declines, so too will the tools available to Tehran for resisting US pressure. Yemen could become the next link in that chain.