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The crash of a Russian-made Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone in Türkiye’s Kocaeli province has raised serious questions that go far beyond a technical malfunction. Coming shortly after an unidentified UAV was intercepted by Turkish F-16s on a NATO/national mission, the incident has triggered speculation over whether these events are isolated accidents—or part of a broader, calculated test of Türkiye’s airspace, defenses, and strategic posture, particularly amid growing tensions around the Black Sea.

Speaking to Azernews, military expert Abdullah Aghar offered a detailed assessment of what these developments could signify.

"One unidentified UAV entered Turkish airspace and was shot down by our F-16 on a NATO/national mission. Let’s say that was a coincidence. But what about the Russian Orlan-10 UAV that crashed in Izmit? The possibility of this being a coincidence is weaker.

I am thinking: could someone be testing the balance between Turkish air defense capabilities, capacity, and rhetoric? Could someone be trying to move the war to the Black Sea?

Due to attacks by warring parties, system errors, or technical malfunctions, UAVs can go out of control and lose their way. This is a normal wartime situation, as seen both during the Garabagh War and frequently in the Ukraine war. But the question remains: is someone sending a message of infiltration into Turkish airspace? Or is someone trying to create asymmetry to heat up the Black Sea? Or are we facing a real-time side effect of the S-400 process?

The simultaneous entry of two UAVs into Turkish airspace, in my opinion, is a multi-layered situation that pushes the boundaries of ‘coincidence,’ but should not yet be attributed to a single cause. I would interpret this as multiple signals—a low-intensity strategic probe.

Let’s go step by step.

One of our F-16s shooting down a UAV: this event alone shows that the rules of engagement were applied, airspace violation was detected, tracking was conducted, and a reflexive response followed. An F-16 strike during a NATO/national mission sends a clear message: ‘I detect, I decide, I shoot.’ This is the correct and expected outcome in terms of defensive reflexes.

However, the immediate discovery of a Russian Orlan-10 in Izmit changes the picture.

The Orlan-10 is not an ordinary platform. It is used for electronic warfare, signal intelligence, air defense and radar surveillance, data link operations, and frequency mapping. Its location—Izmit, very close to Istanbul—is critical. This is an area with a high concentration of industry, transportation, logistics, and both military and civilian infrastructure. This weakens the thesis that it simply drifted accidentally, especially after the first UAV was shot down.

Let us weigh the scenarios one by one.

First: ‘It went out of control and lost its way.’ Theoretically possible, but the Orlan-10’s profile, its crash location, and the timing significantly weaken this explanation. I consider this a low-probability scenario.

Second: ‘An infiltration or surveillance message.’ This is, in my view, the strongest possibility. What does this mean? Türkiye’s radar coverage, reaction time, engagement thresholds, and NATO-versus-national reflexes are being tested in real time. The main task of these UAVs is to determine how deep they can penetrate without being hit. This is not an actual attack, but a strategic pulse check. I see this as a high-probability scenario.

Third: ‘Heating up the Black Sea through asymmetric provocation.’ This is a very serious possibility. Why? Because the war in Ukraine is stuck on land, Russia, NATO, and the UK all focus heavily on maritime domains, and the Montreux Convention is firmly in Türkiye’s hands. If tension increases in the Black Sea, Türkiye may be forced to ‘choose sides,’ and Montreux will come under pressure. UAVs are ideal tools for generating low-intensity, deniable tension. Similar dynamics occurred around Blue Stream and TurkStream. I see this as a medium-to-high probability.

Fourth: ‘A real-time side effect of the S-400 process.’ This should not be overlooked. The issue here is not the S-400 system itself, but the hybridization of Türkiye’s air defense architecture—old NATO systems, national radar and command structures, new domestic air defense assets, and familiarity with Russian-made platforms. Someone may be measuring how integrated Türkiye’s air picture is, where the gaps are, and where divergences exist. This could be both a technical test and a political message. I consider this a medium-probability scenario.

Now, the bigger picture: what is happening?

I do not see a direct attack against Türkiye. But Türkiye’s decision-making algorithm—its will, capacity, and reflexes—are being read in the field. When does it strike? What does it tolerate? Does the NATO label prevail, or does the national reflex dominate? Does Ankara remain silent or make a statement? This is a discourse–capacity balance test. That is why I ask: could our air defense capabilities and our discourse be under examination?

The most dangerous possibility is this: if these incidents become a pattern rather than isolated events—one day Russian, one day of unknown origin, one day from the sea, one day near civilian airspace—then we may be facing a major geopolitical trap. Similar asymmetric events have occurred before, such as the Blue Stream–Nord Stream incidents or the mines that struck the straits at the beginning of the war. Here, I deliberately leave the question of ‘who’ open. Because the real issue is not the perpetrator, but the direction of the push and the axis being forced.

This process follows a chain of developments: the Russian shadow fleet being hit by Ukraine near Türkiye’s coast, Russian attacks on Turkish ships in Ukrainian ports, the escalation of the S-400/F-35 issue, our C-130 being shot down in the Caucasus, and Türkiye finding itself at the intersection of multiple conflicts—Garabagh, Ukraine, Gaza, and Iran–US/Israel—while unresolved dynamics persist in Syria.

But one thing must be remembered clearly: the Ukraine war is not Türkiye’s war. Its root cause lies in the failure of the collapsing USSR to keep its promises. What we must see now is an attempt to prevent the war from spreading to Central Europe and the Baltics, and instead to push it toward the Black Sea—using Türkiye as a proxy.

What you are witnessing is not a coincidence, but it is also not the beginning of a war. It is an operation designed to subtly touch Türkiye’s nerve endings. Every reflex given to these touches will determine the direction of the next phase. The real issue is not the threat itself, but how Türkiye’s response is recorded in strategic memory."