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Efforts to reopen the Alican–Margara border crossing between Türkiye and Armenia have accelerated, signaling a potentially significant shift in regional dynamics.

According to reports by Turkish media, Iğdır Governor Fırat Taşolar has personally inspected the ongoing reconstruction and modernization works at the Alican checkpoint, with technical preparations expected to be completed in the near term.

The momentum around the Alican–Margara crossing also coincides with the construction of the Kars–Iğdır–Aralık–Dilucu railway, a project designed to establish a direct land connection between Türkiye and Azerbaijan via Nakhchivan. Stretching 224 kilometres, the line is planned to carry 5.5 million passengers and 15 million tonnes of cargo annually, a capacity that would significantly strengthen regional transport and logistics networks and reinforce long-term connectivity across the South Caucasus.

While no official opening date has been announced, Ankara has repeatedly stated that once technical work is finalized and political conditions align, the process is ready to move forward. But what would reopening this border really mean, for Türkiye-Armenia relations, for regional connectivity, and for the broader South Caucasus?

To explore these questions in greater depth, AzerNEWS spoke with Dr Kerem Karabulut, an economic expert at Atatürk University, who offered a comprehensive and nuanced assessment of the evolving dynamics.

Responding to a question on the potential impact of reopening the Alican–Margara border crossing on Türkiye–Armenia relations, Dr Karabulut began by situating the issue within its broader historical and political context:

“After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, despite Türkiye’s goodwill efforts, Armenia’s aggressive policies against Azerbaijan—including the occupation of Karabakh, the seizure of roughly twenty percent of Azerbaijani territories, and the Khojaly massacre in which six hundred thirteen women, children, and elderly civilians were killed—led Türkiye to close its borders.”

He stresses that the closure was not only about solidarity with Azerbaijan:

“Armenia also raised territorial claims against Türkiye, made genocide allegations, and demanded compensation. Because of these factors, Türkiye did not develop relations with Armenia and closed its border crossings.”

Dr Karabulut also touched on Ankara's potion that has been clear for years, according to him:

“Türkiye consistently stated that borders could only be opened if Armenia withdrew from Karabakh and abandoned baseless propaganda against Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Before the Karabakh Victory, opening the border was not rational—it would have caused serious political and economic damage to Türkiye and harmed Türkiye–Azerbaijan relations.”

Besides, according to Karabulut, the post-Karabakh Victory environment fundamentally altered this calculation. He argues that the turning point was decisive:

“After the Karabakh Victory, the situation changed. Even if Armenia was not fully willing, Azerbaijan—through the strength of its army and state strategy—regained its territories. Türkiye strongly supported Azerbaijan throughout this process.”

This victory elevated one issue above all others:

“One of the most important outcomes of the Karabakh Victory was the Zangezur Corridor. In my view, it is among the most critical gains of that victory.”

Although Armenia formally accepted the corridor under Russian mediation:

“Subsequent developments unfortunately slowed the process. However, both Azerbaijan and Türkiye have repeatedly stated that they remain determined.”

This determination, he says, directly shaped current policies.

However, the Zangezur Corridor is still central to the opening of the Alican–Margara crossing. The expert explains that infrastructure and diplomacy are now moving in parallel:

“Azerbaijan has already initiated work on the Zangezur Corridor. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan has also stated that he wants good relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan and that Armenia no longer has claims over Karabakh.”

Türkiye’s response followed swiftly:

“Within this framework, Türkiye began constructing the Kars–Iğdır–Nakhchivan railway. Construction is progressing rapidly.”

These developments made reopening border crossings logical:

“Under these conditions, opening Armenia’s border gates—both Akyaka in Kars and the Alican crossing in Iğdır—has become a rational option. Türkiye is pursuing this process in coordination with Azerbaijan.”

Still, Karabulut underlines a red line:

“If any political development emerges that harms Azerbaijan or Türkiye, Türkiye can reverse its stance immediately and keep the borders closed.”

Building on his earlier remarks, Dr Karabulut also highlighted the economic opportunities that could emerge from reopening the border, particularly in light of the new transport and connectivity projects currently underway. In his comment, the expert was realistic about market size, but optimistic about long-term effects:

“Armenia is not a large market—around two and a half million people, with a territory smaller than Konya. On its own, it is not economically significant.”

Yet geography matters:

“Because Armenia borders both Türkiye and Azerbaijan, good relations would benefit Armenia most, but they would also add economic vitality to Türkiye’s border regions.”

He adds a longer-term vision:

“If Armenia avoids repeating historical mistakes, this relationship could evolve into one between friendly states. That would accelerate regional peace, stability, and sustainability.”

Again, the corridor remains key:

“The opening of the Zangezur Corridor should be seen as the linchpin. Once it opens, Türkiye will act much faster and more decisively in opening border gates. Most likely, the borders will open immediately afterward.”

As the discussion turned to the Zangezur Corridor, attention shifted to the wider regional and geopolitical complexities, particularly the role of Iran in shaping this emerging framework of connectivity.Karabulut introduced a broader regional perspective:

“Another critical factor is Iran. Iran was initially slow and not fully constructive regarding Zangezur, which may have contributed to increased American involvement later.”

If Tehran adjusts its approach, new possibilities emerge:

“In the long term, regional railway networks could be developed. A comprehensive regional development corridor could be established—such as Tabriz–Erzurum–Trabzon railways, or even extending lines from Tabriz eastward toward Pakistan.”

Such projects, he argued, would have global implications:

“This would create a regional development corridor of rail networks. Regional and global economies would benefit from the resulting stability and connectivity.”

In conclusion, the economic expert underscored Azerbaijan’s growing strategic significance amid rising global demand for security, highlighting what this evolving role means not only for the country itself but also for the broader balance of power among regional actors.

“This corridor would also guarantee the secure transportation of Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas to Europe and beyond. Stability here is essential for Azerbaijan’s energy links with Europe.”

Even Russia, he noted, would not be excluded:

“Russia is a major regional power and would also benefit from political and economic developments in the region.”

He concluded with a clear takeaway:

“In short, this is not a zero-sum game. There would be many winners, not losers.”