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Nazrin Abdul

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Energy security has long been one of the core priorities of states. Simply put, energy equals life: modern economies, national security, and social stability all depend on uninterrupted access to power. As history shows, the sources of that energy evolve - coal gave way to oil and gas, and today renewable and low-carbon technologies are increasingly part of the mix.

Yet a critical question remains unresolved: can clean energy fully replace fossil fuels, and - perhaps more importantly - will political systems allow it to do so?

This question reveals a deeper truth. Clean energy is not merely a technological or environmental issue; it is profoundly political. Its rise, pace, and limits are shaped less by engineering constraints than by government priorities, market design, and geopolitical rivalry.

For decades, clean energy has advanced primarily where public policy created the conditions for it to do so. Beginning in the 1960s, environmental progress was often driven by strong regulatory intervention - what some critics call the “regulatory sledgehammer.” Over time, this approach expanded into climate and energy policy. Solar power, for example, did not emerge organically from markets alone; it was pushed into existence through mandates, subsidies, and long-term policy signals that reduced risk for investors. The same pattern applies to electric vehicles, batteries, heat pumps, and other core technologies of the low-emissions economy.

The results have been striking. Global investment in low-carbon technologies rose from around $50 billion in 2005 to more than $2 trillion in 2024. Policy-created markets attracted private capital, which in turn accelerated innovation and drove down costs. This feedback loop - policy enabling markets, markets rewarding innovation - helped avert the most catastrophic climate scenarios projected in the 1990s, when warming of five to six degrees Celsius by 2100 was widely feared.

Yet this model now shows signs of strain. Political polarization, fiscal pressure, and geopolitical competition are undermining the policy stability that clean energy depends on. As a result, clean energy is increasingly shaped not by global consensus but by national political systems, each organizing its transition in fundamentally different ways.

The United States: Markets vs. politics

The United States offers a paradoxical case. Clean energy has become deeply politicized at the federal level, yet it continues to expand rapidly at the state and market level. In 2023, wind and solar met 22% of electricity demand in Democratic-leaning states and 17% in Republican-leaning states, according to the US Energy Information Administration. In 2024, wind and solar generated more electricity than coal for the first time in US history - a symbolic and structural turning point.

This shift is driven less by ideology than by economics. Over the past decade, the cost of wind and solar has fallen by 70–90%, making them cheaper than coal and, in many cases, natural gas. In competitive power markets such as Texas, Iowa, and South Dakota, renewables thrive precisely because they are the lowest-cost option. Texas now generates around 35% of its electricity from renewables, saving consumers an estimated $20 million per day compared to fossil-fuel alternatives.

At the same time, federal policy volatility has injected uncertainty. The Trump administration’s 2025 decisions to cancel offshore wind permits - including projects already near completion - sent a chilling signal to investors that contracts may not be politically secure. Trade tariffs, onshoring mandates, and stalled permitting reform have further complicated investment decisions. The message from Washington has been inconsistent: clean energy may be economically attractive, but politically unreliable.

Despite this, investment continues. Firms increasingly hedge against political risk by relying on market fundamentals rather than federal mandates. Clean energy in the US, therefore, is political not because it depends on one party’s ideology, but because policy instability itself has become a risk factor.

China: Clean energy as state strategy

China represents the opposite extreme: a system where clean energy is deeply political by design. Today, around 40% of global clean technology investment takes place in China. The country dominates global production of electric vehicles (over 70%), batteries (77%), and solar panels (more than 80% across the supply chain). Clean energy is embedded in successive five-year plans and treated as a pillar of national industrial strategy.

State-owned utilities and planners play a decisive role, guaranteeing customers for clean power and building massive transmission infrastructure to link renewable-rich regions with industrial centers. China’s ability to mobilize capital and coordinate infrastructure - such as ultra-high-voltage power lines - has enabled scale unmatched elsewhere.

Yet this model carries risks. Provincial competition and heavy subsidies have created overcapacity in EVs, batteries, and solar manufacturing, driving prices down and triggering trade tensions with Europe and the United States. Central planning excels when it backs the right technologies - but when it does not, it can entrench inefficiencies and distort global markets. Still, China’s approach demonstrates how clean energy can function as a tool of geopolitical and economic power, not merely environmental policy.

Europe: Regulation without deep pockets

Europe occupies a middle ground, relying on regulation and market orchestration rather than massive public spending. Governments design markets so that consumers and companies have little choice but to go green. This approach has enabled Europe to lead in sectors like clean steel and carbon capture, where coordination between buyers and suppliers is essential.

However, this model depends heavily on investor confidence and consumer willingness to absorb higher costs. As economic pressures rise, political support for expensive green policies is softening. Germany’s new government, for example, has signaled a more cautious approach to climate regulation in the name of competitiveness. When political priorities shift, investor confidence follows - and often retreats.

Europe’s experience highlights a key vulnerability of clean energy transitions: they are only as durable as the political coalitions that sustain them.

So, is clean energy political?

The evidence points to a clear answer: yes, inherently so. Clean energy challenges existing economic structures, redistributes power between industries and countries, and reshapes energy security. It creates winners and losers - and wherever that happens, politics follows.

Yet clean energy is not political in a single way. In the United States, it advances through markets despite political conflict. In China, it is an extension of state power. In Europe, it is a regulated social contract now under strain. What unites these models is not ideology, but the fact that energy transitions are inseparable from governance.

Ultimately, clean energy’s future will depend less on technological feasibility than on whether political systems can provide stability, credibility, and long-term vision. The transition is no longer a question of if clean energy can work, but how politics will shape who controls it, who benefits from it, and how fast it moves.

In that sense, clean energy is not just political, it is one of the defining political battlegrounds of the 21st century.