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Akbar Novruz

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US Vice President J.D. Vance’s upcoming visit to Armenia and Azerbaijan is notable not only for where he is going, but for the fact that he is going at all. In a year when the Trump administration has sharply limited overseas travel in favor of domestic priorities ahead of the November midterm elections, Vance’s decision to include the South Caucasus in his itinerary marks a deliberate exception. Officially, the trip follows his attendance at the opening ceremony of the 2026 Winter Olympics in Italy. Politically, it signals that Washington sees unfinished business, and rising risk, in a region it helped reshape only months ago.

According to the Associated Press, Vance is expected to arrive in Baku and Yerevan around February 9, using the visit to reaffirm US backing for the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace agreement brokered at the White House last year. That deal, initialed in Washington, committed both sides to opening key transport routes, expanding cooperation with the United States in energy, technology, and the economy, and advancing regional connectivity under the Trump administration’s Roadmap for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). For Washington, the agreement has become both a diplomatic achievement and a test case for sustained US influence in the South Caucasus at a time when Russia’s leverage there is visibly eroding.

But why now, and why send the vice president?

Asked about what makes Armenia and Azerbaijan important enough to warrant one of Vance’s rare foreign trips, former US State Department official Paul Goble points first to the broader regional picture.

“Both Azerbaijan and Armenia are increasingly important to the US, not only because they have each distanced themselves from Moscow and support TRIPP,” Goble explains, “but also because tensions over Iran are certainly going to spill over into the South Caucasus.”

From this perspective, the visit is less about ceremony and more about reassurance. Goble argues that Vance is arriving in Baku and Yerevan “to reassure them of US support and cheer them on concerning the directions they have been going,” at a moment when instability south of the region could quickly affect security calculations to the north.

That assessment also reframes the timing. While the midterm elections loom large in Washington, Goble believes they are not the primary driver.

“I think the problems in Iran explain the timing of the visit far more than the midterms,” he says, though he adds that Vance is “certainly” aware of the domestic political upside, “perhaps especially in Armenia, given the number of Armenians in key districts in the US,” and in light of what Goble describes as Vance’s likely presidential ambitions in the next election cycle.

Another question hovering over the visit is how prepared Washington is to respond if the peace agreement begins to fray. Mutual accusations of violations are not uncommon in post-conflict environments, and the South Caucasus is no exception.

Here, Goble is blunt about US concerns.

“Washington is certainly aware that each side in the South Caucasus is likely to accuse the other of violating the deal Trump oversaw in August 2025,” he notes. “What it wants to do is to ensure that such charges do not escalate into open conflict.”

The task, as Goble frames it, is not adjudication but containment: “managing and reassuring both sides of American support for the deal and for all who keep faithful to that deal.”

Geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, president of Scarab Rising, Inc., places the visit in an even starker strategic context. For her, the question is not why Washington is engaging now, but why it could no longer afford not to.

“The balance of power in that region has broken down,” Tsukerman says, “and Washington no longer has the option of ignoring it.”

What was once a frozen or managed situation, she argues, has become fluid, with decisions made in the coming year likely to “lock in outcomes for a long time.” From this angle, US involvement is about shaping the trajectory before it hardens without American input.

Tsukerman draws a clear distinction between Washington’s calculations in Yerevan and in Baku. Armenia, she notes, is in the midst of a forced strategic rethink.

“Its leadership has lost confidence in the security system it depended on for decades,” she explains. “That has forced the country to rethink how it protects its borders, who it trusts for military cooperation, and how it connects economically to the outside world.”

These, she emphasizes, are not abstract debates but immediate policy choices. A vice-presidential visit, in that sense, serves as a credibility signal.

“If Washington fails to show up when those risks are real, it weakens American influence far beyond the Caucasus,” Tsukerman warns. “A vice presidential visit tells Armenian leaders that the United States is paying attention at the highest level.”

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, occupies a different position in Washington’s calculus — not as a country in search of leverage, but as one that already has it.

“Azerbaijan matters because it now holds most of the leverage in the region,” Tsukerman says, pointing to its control over “key transport routes, energy corridors, and security dynamics.”

For the US, engaging Baku is not optional if it wants influence over how these systems evolve. Ignoring Azerbaijan, she argues, “would simply push it to make long term commitments without US input.”

This explains why Vance is visiting both capitals on the same tour. As Tsukerman puts it, the goal is “shaping behavior through presence rather than pressure,” especially at a time when external powers that once enforced stability “are no longer able to enforce guarantees.”

The domestic political calendar still matters, however, in how Washington frames its message. Tsukerman notes that ahead of the midterms, the administration is keen to show voters that it is managing risks without drifting into new conflicts.

“A diplomatic visit allows the White House to present engagement as preventative and cost conscious rather than reactive or crisis driven,” she says.

That logic shapes the tone in each capital. In Armenia, the emphasis is on partnership and reform “without promising open ended security guarantees.” In Azerbaijan, the message centers on predictability and restraint — cooperation with Washington as a source of legitimacy, and destabilizing actions as a liability.

Taken together, the visit underscores a shift in how the South Caucasus is viewed in Washington. As Tsukerman concludes,

“Armenia and Azerbaijan are no longer treated as distant or secondary issues. They are viewed as places where timely diplomacy can still shape outcomes before they harden into long term problems.”

For the Trump administration — and for J.D. Vance personally — this makes the trip less a courtesy call and more a strategic bet.