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For more than three decades, global leaders have reassured themselves, and their publics, that the so-called rules-based international order remains the backbone of global stability. Even as wars multiply, institutions stall, and power politics return with renewed confidence, the language of multilateralism continues to dominate summit halls and diplomatic communiqués. Davos is no exception.

At the World Economic Forum in Davos this year, the Canadian prime minister, Mark Carney, delivered an address with an unusual bluntness for the rarefied Alpine stage. “If we are not at the table, we are on the menu,” Carney warned that the international order established after the Cold War is not merely evolving; it is fracturing. His message was stark: nostalgia for the “rules‑based international order” no longer suffices; that order is functionally bankrupt.

Carney’s critique struck a nerve because it did not couch itself in the usual diplomatic euphemisms. He articulated what many policymakers privately feel but seldom state openly: the familiar architecture of global governance, from the United Nations to the OSCE, is straining under the weight of great power rivalry and selective enforcement of international law. “This is not naïve multilateralism,” he said, “nor is it relying on their institutions. It’s building coalitions that work issue by issue with partners who share enough common ground to act together.”

If the rules are still intact, why do they fail so consistently at moments of crisis? If international institutions remain central, why are they so often bypassed when real decisions are made? And if the order is merely “under strain,” why are new frameworks and alternative coalitions quietly emerging to replace it?

Speaking to Azernews, German analyst Brendan Ziegler noted that the forum this year exposed a growing disconnect between diplomatic language and geopolitical reality. "Davos was less about celebrating global cooperation and more about managing its erosion,” Ziegler observed:

"What made Carney’s remarks stand out was not their novelty, but their candour. For decades, global leaders have continued to invoke the “rules-based international order” as a stabilising mantra, even as its mechanisms steadily lost relevance. In Davos, Carney said aloud what many policymakers privately acknowledge: nostalgia is no longer a strategy, and the old order is functionally bankrupt.

His critique was aimed squarely at the architecture of global governance itself. Institutions once presented as universal arbiters, from the United Nations to the OSCE, are increasingly paralysed by great-power rivalry and selective application of international law. Carney rejected what he described as naïve multilateralism, arguing instead for coalitions that work “issue by issue” with partners sharing enough common ground to act. It was a tacit admission that universality has given way to utility.

This assessment came amid a deteriorating global backdrop. War in Ukraine, instability across the Middle East and the Red Sea, and mounting tensions around Taiwan have exposed how ill-equipped existing institutions are to prevent escalation or even manage crises. In practice, outcomes are now determined less by agreed rules than by the distribution of power. Where power can be imposed, it overrides norms; where it cannot, international law survives largely as text."

According to Ziegler, these questions were brought into sharp focus by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s unusually direct intervention. Carney’s remarks did not signal a routine call for reform, but a recognition that the post–Cold War system is facing structural failure rather than incremental change. “What we are witnessing,” Ziegler said, “is not a transition within the system, but a challenge to the system itself, one that forces states, particularly middle powers, to rethink how security, sovereignty, and cooperation can realistically be preserved:

"The United States, long the principal architect of the post-1991 system, increasingly advances its interests through unilateral measures, using tariffs, sanctions, and financial pressure as instruments of coercion. The European Union continues to speak the language of norms and values, yet often lacks the political cohesion or hard power necessary to enforce them. Meanwhile, traditional security arrangements and regional organisations are routinely bypassed. Conflicts erupt and escalate without credible institutional pathways for de-escalation. Structures built on the assumption of shared commitment to common rules now appear brittle, exposed by the very crises they were designed to manage. Carney’s underlying message was unambiguous: the old rules no longer guarantee security or prosperity. Power fills the vacuum where institutions fail.

Seen through this lens, the signing of the “Board of Peace” in Davos carries symbolic weight. Officially presented as a peacebuilding initiative, it also reflects a quieter truth: existing frameworks, including the UN Security Council, are no longer trusted to manage real conflicts effectively. The proliferation of new platforms and charters is less a sign of institutional vitality than an admission that the old ones no longer function as advertised. No one in Davos declared the rules-based order dead. Yet the growing reliance on bespoke coalitions and issue-specific blocs suggests a decisive shift away from universalism toward selective, interest-driven cooperation. Carney’s appeal to middle powers was especially telling."

The idea of "New World Order" has always been under discussion and has acted as a subject of scrutiny. If there is a "new system," as they claim, then there must be principles that support the fundamental; anything else would be considered nothing but an act of bravado or mere concept. The old order is not yet dead. But as Carney implied in Davos, it is no longer the engine of global stability it once claimed to be, and pretending otherwise may be the most dangerous illusion of all, the German analyst concluded his remarks.