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Nazrin Abdul

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Iran entered this year following the forceful suppression of large-scale mass protests, marking a turbulent start to an already fragile political environment. Shortly thereafter, diplomatic efforts to ease tensions over Tehran’s nuclear program stalled. The second round of nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran, held on February 17, ended without progress. A third round of talks took place in Geneva on February 26 but also failed to produce results. Tehran refused to halt uranium enrichment, dismantle nuclear facilities, or accept indefinite restrictions on the development of its nuclear program.

In the early hours of February 28, Israel and the United States launched airstrikes against Iran. Following reports of the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, images circulated suggesting a divided public response inside the country. While some groups demonstrated support for the ruling establishment, others, particularly younger Iranians, reacted differently, with visible signs of relief or celebration. Against a backdrop of mounting social and political tensions, questions have arisen about the durability of Iran’s internal stability.

To assess the situation, we spoke with Iranian political analyst Mohammad Rahmanifar, who argues that Iran is already deeply fragmented along social and political lines.

According to Rahmanifar, a segment of the population remains loyal to the government due to ideological and religious convictions, particularly rooted in Shiite beliefs. “A certain portion of the population stands behind the government and mourns Khamenei’s death,” he said. “For many of them, this is not only political but ideological and religious. I believe they will remain loyal to the government to the very end, as they have until now.”

However, he stresses that a broader segment of society, especially the youth, has grown weary of the current leadership. Over the past two decades, Iran has experienced repeated waves of large-scale protests, reflecting deep societal dissatisfaction. “If we look at the timeline, particularly over the last ten years, we have witnessed major anti-government protests roughly every three years,” Rahmanifar noted. “Three years ago, there were widespread protests. Just one month ago, there were large-scale demonstrations again. Each time, the authorities suppressed them with significant bloodshed.”

He referred specifically to the protests in early January of this year, citing figures indicating that more than 30,000 people were allegedly shot and killed during the unrest. According to the analyst, the families of those victims remain deeply aggrieved, and the killing of Khamenei does not address or heal those wounds. “In my personal view, Iran could fracture internally at any moment,” Rahmanifar said.

Even if the current government manages to withstand external military pressure from the United States and Israel - a prospect Rahmanifar views as uncertain - he believes domestic stability would remain elusive. “Even if the government defends itself against the U.S. and Israel, it will not be able to restore order. On the contrary, many people appear to be watching how far this war will go and may be waiting for an opportunity to resume protests,” he argued.

Beyond the immediate political crisis, concerns are growing over potential ethnic and regional fragmentation within Iran’s multiethnic society. In particular, developments in Kurdish-populated areas have drawn attention. Rahmanifar claims that several Kurdish organizations have recently published maps that include cities in Iran’s South Azerbaijan region, such as Urmia and Sulduz, as part of a proposed Kurdish territory.

“In recent days, five Kurdish organizations have made statements in which they included certain South Azerbaijani cities in their maps, presenting them as Kurdish cities,” he said.

He further alleged that some of these groups are affiliated with or linked to organizations such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its Iranian offshoot, PJAK, which he described as having a history of militant activity. According to Rahmanifar, political activists in cities such as Urmia and Tabriz have expressed greater concern about potential territorial claims by Kurdish groups than about the broader U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict.

The analyst also pointed to intensified airstrikes in western South Azerbaijani cities, questioning their strategic rationale. He cited attacks on locations such as Sayin Qala (Persian name - Shahin Dej), Sulduz, and facilities linked to local police and border guard commanders in Urmia. “Some of these locations appear to have little strategic value for the United States or Israel,” he said. “This raises the question: what is the broader objective?”

Rahmanifar suggested that the strikes may be creating conditions for future developments on the ground. He claims there are preparations underway that could enable Kurdish armed groups to launch systematic operations in South Azerbaijan under the pretext of opposing the current Iranian government, while potentially seeking territorial gains.

Such a scenario, he argues, would have broader regional implications, particularly for Turkiye and Azerbaijan, given the large population of ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran. “There are millions of South Azerbaijani Turks,” he said. “In that context, specially Turkiye cannot remain indifferent to the fate of their ethnic kin.”

As tensions escalate both externally and internally, Iran faces a complex and volatile convergence of military confrontation, political unrest, and ethnic sensitivities, factors that together raise serious questions about the country’s near-term stability and territorial cohesion.