Peace forced upon Pashinyan: Will he budge?
By Orkhan Amashov
When President Aliyev shook hands with Prime Minister Pashinyan for the first time since the end of the Second Karabakh War and looked upon the beleaguered Armenian leader with a superior and condescendingly benevolent smile in Brussels on the final day of August, many were quick to interpret the ice-breaking propensity of the moment.
Without any intention to read much into the body language or engage in waggish sugar-coating, that instance was a revealing picture of the ongoing negotiations between Baku and Yerevan, foretelling an impending outcome.
Beneath the superficial
One should never marvel at the superficial, save for occasions when the externally observable reflects the substance. Azerbaijan’s coercively assertive steps have narrowed the confines within which Armenia can dither and teeter. Three fundamentals appear to have guided Baku’s moves since November 2020: the emphasis on interstate normalisation, depriving the Karabakh subject of its primary relevance in the negotiations, and accelerating the preparation of a lasting peace treaty.
Yerevan seems to have taken due note and readjusted itself to an extent. Both Moscow and increasingly more influential Brussels formats have been dealing with the delimitation and demarcation issue of the state border, and the opening of communications and topics related to humanitarian matters, all of which are integral to the interstate domain.
Pashinyan, save for occasional gusts of wind blurting out regarding the status theme, seems to be set on highlighting the security and rights of the Armenians of Karabakh, whilst simultaneously making implicit hints at the recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. The latest EU-mediated Brussels meeting has added impetus to negotiations on a peace treaty, the first draft of which is to be presented by the sides by late September.
On top of this, President Aliyev, in a recent interview with the Italian Il Sole 24 Ore, stated that a comprehensive deal could be signed in a few months. This was confirmed by Pashinyan, who stated that a peace treaty could be concluded by the end of the year, according to Armenian media outlet Hraparak.
Post-Brussels scenery
The game is afoot again. The 31 August Brussels gathering has had its impact. The question is how the parties will capitalise on what has been agreed. Baku’s imminent mode of action is predictable. It is clear about what it wants, for the context in which it sees a future peace has been deftly summarised at every available opportunity.
What is unclear, however, is how readily Pashinyan’s government can meet the challenge and be clear about what is to come in his backyard. The can-kicking instinct of the Armenian leadership is there and is unlikely to fade away. Deadlines are viewed as merely desirable goals, rather than firm obligations in Yerevan’s tactical mindset, as manifestly revealed during the discussion on the opening of the new Lachin route. We can thus assume the 30 September target date will, in all probability, be subject to attempts to stretch by the incorrigible procrastinator of the process, this time possibly with no success.
However overwhelming may Pashinyan’s internal challenges be, his present predicament is less burdensome than was the case before July 2021. Defenestration does not seem imminent. Being electorally safe for the time being, it is incumbent upon him to leave a peacemaker legacy before being turfed out of office, which certainly cannot be overruled.
As British journalist Neil Watson commented: “Pashinyan has already stayed in power against all the odds. His objective now is to save face and do what he believes is best for his people. However, this may include procrastination, as he hopes the scales of Russian favour tip back in the direction of Yerevan, particularly after 2025 and the probable end of the Russian ‘peacekeeping’ operation on the border.”
Legacy at stake
Pashinyan's demurring internal critics may say he will go down in history as “the Prime Minister who lost Karabakh” and this cannot be changed. Yet he may find that his calling is to be a leader that makes peace with Azerbaijan, ending a century-plus-long animosity and resultant economic degradation.
Appearing somewhat cerebrally challenged, albeit mostly under pressure, and decidedly unstatesmanlike, Pashinyan has never been expected to fire on all four cylinders in instigating the most sensible actions in relation to the negotiations with Azerbaijan. However, it would be wholly unfair to begrudge him the potential to excel in his often-lackluster self in the subjective department of reason.
When it comes to his political acumen, he may have fewer marbles between his ears than advertised by his supporters, but he is not a chump incapable of overcoming passing whims and exercising some realpolitik. The former Sargsyan regime’s Karabakh narrative is not what he concurs with, but there are more than a few dregs left in his cup from the preceding user. He will need to soundly birch the leftover extremist elements in his own circle and beyond.
More than anything else, he is bound to ditch his lexicon of rigmarole-induced non-words and provide sufficient clarity on the negotiations whilst speaking to ordinary Armenians. Flinging a pot of paint in the form of re-rehearsals of unchanging reiterations is bound to be of no avail. Pashinyan may not be prone to rhetorical flourish, but he knows what is necessary.
And, finally, what Armenia needs is statesmanship, not brinkmanship. The former requires tough decisions based on carefully considered risks and opportunities. Escalation and vacillation are the two extremes he needs to avoid, as both are capable of spawning implications that may prove to be hideous to contemplate.
Any attempt to shrink from this duty encapsulates the inherent danger of paving the way for an unfortunate situation in which he will find himself on the perilous thin end of the wedge, as was the case in late September.
The journey ahead is bound to be compelling, if not pitiless. Excessive moralising could be a drag, but Azerbaijan is not pursuing a line of “winner takes it all, without a trace of empathy or remorse”. Again, history has presented Pashinyan with a chance to secure his legacy. Budging won’t help. Action is obligatory.
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