Russia is on the firing line, as its mediatory credibility is increasingly diminished
By Orkhan Amashov
In a vain bid to bolster its weakening sway over the Azerbaijani-Armenian peace process, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted another of those trilateral meetings on 31 October and achieved practically nothing, other than a written confirmation that Baku and Yerevan are “appreciative” of the Russian peacekeepers temporarily stationed in Karabakh.
Relevance test
If Putin’s genuine intention was to mediate some Russian-controlled mini-breakthrough, then his travails were of no avail. If he wanted to give a mere simulacrum of progress via his good offices, then he appeared to be too enfeebled to be the source of authority, particularly when he concluded that the meeting was “useful”, his verdict falling short of resounding self-praise. He admitted that the main points included within the provisional text of the declaration were omitted from the final document.
However, to suggest that the trilateral Sochi summit was a complete non-event would not be right either, as the final document should not be solely viewed in terms of what was included therein, but also in the context of what the parties were striving to incorporate and how it panned out.
As was initially apparent during the 28 October session of the Kremlin-led Collective Security Organisation Treaty (CSTO) preceding the trilateral meeting and, later, in Sochi on 31 October, the firm intention of Yerevan was to garner some sympathetic recognition on several counts.
Firstly, Pashinyan wanted the recent 12–14 September escalation to be blamed on Azerbaijan, resulting in the installation of security mechanisms on the border for delimitation. Secondly, he also proposed a return to the positions held before May 2021. Thirdly, he wanted the declaration to reflect the Armenian view that Azerbaijani control over the Farrukh height is encroaching on the temporary zone under the responsibility of the Russian contingent in Karabakh.
Fourthly, it was Yerevan’s design to include a clause on the repatriation of all Armenian detainees currently in Azerbaijan. Fifthly, Pashinyan was willing to achieve a compromise on the prolongation of the term of the Russian peacekeepers for 10–20 years, after which a sense of permanency would pervade.
Sixthly, and most importantly, during the trilateral meeting, the Armenian Prime Minister proposed “the Russian project on the Basic Principles”, focusing on the bilateral interstate relations between the parties, to be referenced in the final document.
None of these made it to the 31 October declaration which, apart from the questionably positive assessment of the Russian peacekeeping mission, entails points on the “non-use of force” and “the mutual recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders in accordance with the UN Charter and the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991”.
These clauses are not light years away from what was enshrined in the 6 October Prague declaration and cannot be seen as remotely new. These declarative clauses all require tight definitions so as to assume a definable meaning and Russia, whose mediatory role is understandably hinging on maintaining "constructive ambiguity", could not be expected to be the initiator of "dangerously specific" constructs.
President Aliyev, on the other hand, was operating under no delusions of achieving a sweeping breakthrough, and contented himself with foiling Armenian attempts, reiterating the essentials of Baku's negotiating position and declaring, with a sense of self-consequence, the most critical of the myriad points made throughout the whole meeting: "The Karabakh conflict is history; it was resolved two years ago. Therefore, there is practically nothing to discuss in this context, and achievement of the normalisation of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations requires very serious steps". Given Putin's earlier statements alluding to the judiciousness of deciding on Karabakh's fate at a later stage, this was also a riposte to the Russian President.
Russia’s game
Moscow must feel that it is owed something by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The 10 November 2020 declaration that ended the Second Karabakh War was devastating for Yerevan. But it could have been far worse, had the Kremlin not brokered a deal ending the hostilities. Russia might also think that, by brokering this self-same deal, it “allowed” Baku to get what it wanted, without frustrating its own strategic objectives. It may very well be possible that this mindset is still central to Vladimir Putin’s sense of primacy and his erstwhile attempts to ensure Russian centrality in the post-2020 negotiations.
Since the Kremlin is adamant about its desire to pull the strings, it understands it cannot please both sides, and needs to be “beastly” and “benevolent” towards both parties in a measured way, so as to fix the necessary balance. The CSTO has repeatedly snubbed Yerevan’s pleas to interfere after the recent border escalation, with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s swift reprimand of Prime Minister Pashinyan in the latest session being most noteworthy.
Simultaneously, Putin reminded Armenia in his Valdai speech that, unlike the so-called Washington document envisaging the recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh, within the negotiations mediated under the aegis of Moscow, there is some vague possibility that “certain characteristics of the region” will be taken into account.
The benevolence towards Baku could be said to have manifested itself as a virtual absence of Russian on-ground military backing for Armenia and not completely superficial siding with Azerbaijan over the Zangazur Corridor project. Nevertheless, Moscow does not share Baku’s view that the Karabakh problem is resigned to the past, speaking of it in the present sense with irregular frequency.
It is within Russia's interests to keep both sides in a state in which they risk committing an unpardonable act of ingratitude towards the Kremlin and obviate such an eventuality on the pain of unfavourable repercussions. The Kremlin's design favours an environment in which Baku and Yerevan face an uphill battle with a prospect of falling further down preying more heavily on their minds than the criticality of moving upwards. Like a complex game of snakes and ladders, ascent is naturally accompanied by the risk of falling into the abyss.
It could be assumed that Moscow is not just disinterested in a peace treaty without its active involvement, but does not favour any comprehensive deal anytime soon. Russia’s way of looking at the negotiations appears to be that long, arduous discussions on the delimitation and demarcation (DD) of the state border and the reopening of communications should be pursued under its aegis, with a final treaty left for an unspecified future date.
This also complements the view that the Russian peacekeeping contingent is necessary and should remain in place until the sides agree on the DD subject and sign a peace treaty. In other words, by suggesting that a comprehensive deal should not be viewed as an immediate objective to be reached as quickly as possible, the Kremlin is seeking to prolong the duration of its peacekeeping mission in Karabakh.
All in all, the Sochi convocation revealed Russia's longstanding stubborn urge to maintain its perceived mediatory primacy, despite its increasingly weakened hold over the state of affairs in the wake of the Ukrainian situation. Since the onset of the crisis, the Moscow format of post-conflict normalisation has been gradually evolving into a slow, arduous, substance-free and deeply formalistic platform that is drifting into irrelevance..
Pashinyan's calculations seem to rely on pressing an improbable geopolitical reset button, rendering a quasi-miraculous escape from "doom". His distinctly presentist temperament is one of the main weaknesses shrouding his horizons. In fact, Pashinyan was reasonably brave to propound certain proposals, the realisation of which is impossible, due to his lacking both the art of persuasion and sufficient political weight.
Nevertheless, he perhaps should be commended for proposing a question to Putin which was asked through a cumulative force of ungratified requests: "What are you ready to give Armenia that the West is unwilling to provide?". The answer can only be hypothetical and be regarded as one akin to "as the lesser of the evils, Moscow could still furnish the best possible deal for Armenia".
Neil Watson, British Journalist, commented: "As far as Azerbaijan and Western public opinion is concerned, Russia's role as a negotiator has been sacrificed, due to its Ukrainian incursion. However, Armenia is like a drowning man grasping for a straw. A beweakened Russia is like a large leaking raft. It will stay afloat for a long time – just – but eventually will slowly sink. Pinning its hopes on Russia is now Armenia's only hope to delay accepting the inevitable."
The situation is different with the Azerbaijani leader, of course. President Aliyev is not just envisaging the future, but effectively instigating a vision, in which there is no place for dithering and teetering. In Sochi, he was crystal-clear again. No misbegotten proposal that views Karabakh's future in uncertain terms or as a matter for future deliberations will be touched with a barge pole. Russia has displayed "self-serving" open-mindedness regarding all sorts of eventualities. But, when the final curtain is about to fall, the Kremlin, too, will face its onerous duty to bow out, recede into ignominy and lick its wounds like an embattled, elderly lion.
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