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By Orkhan Amashov

Sinews were stiffened and hopes were high on the eve of the Brussels meeting of the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders, President Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, held under the auspices of the EU within a trilateral format. The following day, there seems to be general satisfaction that the original reserved optimism, which was not groundless, has been reasonably justified.

The assumption made was that the meeting would mark the beginning of substantive talks over a peace agreement. Charles Michel, the EU leader, through whose mediation the talks took place, confirmed in his post-meeting statement that both sides have instructed their foreign ministries to start working on a comprehensive deal.

This is currently the most critical result from the meeting. Any further eventuality that may emerge will likely be centred upon this key achievement.

EU’s finest moment, as yet

The EU’s clout and leverage over the matter seem to have increased. If the previous December meeting was perceived as more of an additional forum, set to deal with the issues falling beyond the rubric of the Moscow-meditated trilateral format, now it appears to be on a par with the Kremlin, as a sufficient degree of pervasiveness regarding the array of subjects has been achieved.

The humanitarian aspect is still potent. But there is much more to what Brussels could offer. The talks mediated by the Kremlin and the EU have previously been intertwined, what is new now is that a more holistic atmosphere, encompassing both centres, seems to have to come to fruition. And that is despite the fact that the relations between the West and Russia are at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold War.

Charles Michel’s positive assessment as to the effect that the parties have started to listen to each other, and understand each other’s priorities, is particularly confidence-inducing when one thinks of the recent exchange that took place during the course of March - Baku’s five-point plan and Armenia’s reaction - which was not one of repudiation, but of implicit acquiescence.

Of course, it is a task of some guesswork as to what the EU leader actually meant by “growing mutual understanding”, but the facts available and their proper evaluation point to the course of the defining force, which is Baku.

The point on the creation of a bilateral commission to deal with the issues of delimitation and demarcation is noteworthy, as it appears to be in harmony with the similar provisions embedded in the Sochi declaration, which assigned the deadline as "late 2022”, whereas now the process seems to have been intensified, as “late April” is the new date. This new sense of urgency should not be overlooked.

Again, as anticipated, there is no mention of the beleaguered OSCE Minsk Group, despite Armenia’s insistence, which was evident in Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan’s statement concerning Azerbaijan’s five-point plan. The OSCE Minsk Group has long exhausted itself, and it is only a matter of time when a final coup de grace will be officially delivered.

The fate of the Karabakh Armenians is not touched upon either. There is no remote allusion to the right of self-determination, nor the subject of the status, to which Yerevan has been desperate to give an “official sounding” within the trilateral format. Yet it nevertheless remains the key point of contention, and one probably would not appear to presume too much if one surmises that a vast portion of the behind-the-doors discussions must have been dedicated to this subject.

What we can infer is that, as a continuation of the logic of the March exchange, Yerevan is conscious that Karabakh is Azerbaijan. It may also be possible that Pashinyan has almost grasped the impossibility of the creation of an administrative unit with an explicit Armenian character under the jurisdiction of Baku.

Dismal mental gymnastics

Yet there is one possibility that may be deemed probable and realistically achievable in Yerevan’s view, and that is to give the Armenian segment of Karabakh certain political rights, as Azerbaijani citizens no doubt, but specifically designed to attain some identity-protection purposes.

This, of course, would mean the foundation of some construct that the sides might work out and then explain to their respective internal audiences. The Armenian leader may articulate, through his increased emphasis on the political nature of the presently hypothetical rights, pointing to their vague and barely discernible link with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, cited in one of Mirzoyan’s latest statements, that hopes for self-determination are not dead as such.

This, of course, would involve painstaking mental gymnastics and wishful thinking, but once found himself cornered and bedevilled with a litany of painful inevitabilities, this may be the only course available to him.

As to the import of the protest that took place the day preceding the Brussels convocation, as far as the news coming from the EU capital has revealed by now, this has, in no discernibly substantial way, impacted the talks. Naturally, one cannot exclude the possibility that Pashinyan did address certain potential difficulties which could be caused by internal disgruntlement, on the way to achieving a peace deal, although even if such insinuations have been made, they have not yielded desirable effects, nor influenced the discussions.

Pashinyan is, in his own way, a player. And there is nothing wrong about being a player if you are in politics. The crucial point is not to descend into “politicking”, as the Armenian PM did on certain occasions in the past, both prior to the war and subsequently. But he is a consummate vote-grabber who has survived the post-war turmoil and won the 2021 elections; hence, his powers of persuasion when it comes to gaining popular support in the face of painful realities should not be underestimated.

Nothing excluded

Some commentators seem to opine that, despite its peace-creating agenda, the results of the Brussels meeting do not militate against Azerbaijan’s right to finalise the situation by removing the remaining Armenian separatist forces in Karabakh by force. The recent escalation over the strategically vital Farrukh height, which was within the area of responsibility of the Russian peacekeepers, and Baku’s defiant approach in the face of the Kremlin’s initial rebuke, make one assume that Azerbaijan will consider “all options open” to ensure the implementation of Article 4 of the ceasefire deal.

As diplomats, political insiders and spin-doctors know only too well, the negotiations behind closed doors focus on details and deadly vital niceties; nevertheless, when their results are communicated to the public, vague constructs aimed at supporting a fragile process seem to take precedence over specifics. The task of a fair-minded external observer is to mentally reverse this and go back to the essential substance in the light of available sources.

Therefore, any conclusion that could possibly be made on the day following the actual meeting remains nascent and tentative. However, it would by no means be a sign of contrived reasoning to suggest that the irresistible force of the logic of the developments of the past months has given rise to optimism, which is still reserved, but has nevertheless become increasingly reinforced.

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