Azernews.Az

By Farman Aydin I Azernews

In recent months, the European Union’s (EU) policy toward the South Caucasus has increasingly come under scrutiny. Although official Brussels continues to emphasise its commitment to peace, stability, and cooperation, the actual steps taken and the documents adopted often point in the opposite direction. This contradiction becomes especially evident in the context of Azerbaijan–Armenia relations, where new realities are emerging after years of conflict. Instead of embracing these developments and supporting genuine normalisation, the EU’s position appears inconsistent, selective, and at times openly biased.

One of the clearest examples of this inconsistency is the recent document signed between the EU and Armenia. Strikingly, the text makes no reference to the peace agenda shaped with the mediation of US President Donald Trump, nor to the TRIPP project proposed within that framework. This omission is not accidental. Rather, it reflects Brussels’ deliberate attempt to sideline the Washington platform and elevate the Paris–Brussels axis as the primary channel of influence in the region. Such a move reveals the EU’s preference for geopolitical manoeuvring over genuine support for reconciliation.

It is also no longer a secret that influential liberal and globalist circles within the EU, including networks associated with George Soros, are uneasy about the real peace process taking shape in the South Caucasus. For these groups, the emergence of an independent regional balance is less attractive than the preservation of a controlled tension. Managed instability allows external actors to maintain leverage, while genuine peace would reduce their influence. In this light, hearings on Azerbaijan held in the European Parliament are less about human rights concerns and more about applying political pressure.

The European Parliament’s approach to Azerbaijan has long been characterised by systematic double standards. Before the 2020 Patriotic War, the institution often failed to support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity to the same extent as it did for Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova. Instead, baseless accusations and slanders were frequently directed against Baku. This selective approach exposes the existence of a distorted understanding of law within the European Parliament, where principles are applied inconsistently depending on political convenience.

Another contradiction lies in the EU’s activation of the EUMA mission in Armenia, which operates without a legitimate mandate. Far from contributing to trust-building or real security, this mission serves to freeze existing tensions and legitimise external interference. By strengthening such mechanisms, Brussels undermines the very peace agenda it claims to support.

The EU’s loyal stance toward Armenia is also evident in the sphere of sanctions. On the one hand, five ships linked to Azerbaijan have been subjected to restrictions. On the other hand, similar activities carried out through other countries, such as Cyprus and more, are overlooked. Germany’s continued large-scale energy imports from Russia, the transfer of European-produced electronics to Russia via Armenia, and their subsequent use in the war against Ukraine further highlight Brussels’ selective principles. Such contradictions weaken the EU’s credibility and raise questions about its true priorities.

Equally troubling is the European Parliament’s silence regarding human rights abuses in Armenia. While the institution regularly organises hearings on Azerbaijan, it has failed to respond to the imprisonment of dozens of opposition figures, religious leaders, and public activists in Armenia in 2025 on fabricated charges. These cases neither become topics of hearings nor appear in official documents. The double standard is glaring: Azerbaijan is constantly criticised, while Armenia’s violations are ignored.

Moreover, over the past four years, Armenia has become one of the main channels for parallel imports and exports to Russia under the sanctions regime. Yet this reality is overlooked by European structures. At the same time, while the European Parliament calls on Azerbaijan to release alleged war criminals, it adopts a contradictory stance regarding Ruben Vardanyan, presented as one of the oligarchs who financed the war against Ukraine. Such inconsistencies further erode trust in Brussels’ declarations.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the EU is once again attempting to redraw dividing lines in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s growing regional and international influence is causing visible concern in Brussels. Yet the reality is that the EU itself is experiencing a deep political and institutional crisis and is gradually losing its subjectivity in global politics. References in the new US National Security Strategy to the erosion of values in Europe openly confirm this decline.

Under these circumstances, the European Parliament’s biased debates on Azerbaijan have no real legal or political impact. At the core of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy lie national interests, and there is no turning back from this course. Unless the EU abandons its outdated narratives and embraces a more balanced approach, it will not be able to gain the status of a reliable partner in the South Caucasus.