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Akbar Novruz

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After years of ambiguity, hedging, and regional miscalculations, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has delivered what may be one of his most grounded press conferences to date. On July 16, in front of the Armenian and international press, Pashinyan laid bare the evolving contours of his foreign and domestic policy. He appears to understand the structural constraints of Armenian foreign policy given the current circumstances. More importantly, he is aware from his own experience that states suffer consequences if they ignore the changing power dynamics in their neighbourhood. His message was clear: Armenia must come to terms with regional realities or risk further isolation.

This time, unlike the evasive rhetoric of past years, Pashinyan’s words were marked by a striking level of political sobriety. "Yes, in 2022, I recognised the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and that Garabagh is part of it. This decision should have been made much earlier," the Armenian leader admitted—an admission few of his predecessors dared make. The recognition, he added, stemmed from a basic geopolitical logic: “Armenia cannot recognise its territorial integrity without recognising the territorial integrity of its neighbours.”

Indeed, for a country historically trapped in irredentism and romantic nationalism, such realism is commendable. It marks the start, not the end, of a painful but necessary recalibration.

Perhaps the most notable takeaway from the press conference was Pashinyan’s practical stance on the issue of restoring regional transport and communication corridors with Azerbaijan. “We are interested in restoring bilateral trade relations with Azerbaijan, ensuring connectivity from Azerbaijan to the territory of Armenia or to third countries, as well as ensuring Armenia's access to third countries through the territory of Azerbaijan,” he stated.

This goes beyond mere infrastructure—it’s about anchoring Armenia’s economic future in reality. Pashinyan even floated the idea of transferring the management of the route between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan to a private company, comparing it to the already outsourced management of Zvartnots airport. “I do not believe that Armenia's jurisdiction or territorial integrity has been violated in any way here,” he said.

In doing so, he is attempting to take the emotional sting out of regional connectivity projects and reframe them as economic opportunities rather than existential threats.

Peace with Türkiye comes as a strategic necessity

Pashinyan’s realism also extends to one of the most emotionally and politically charged issues in Armenian public life: the relationship with Türkiye. “If Armenia does not make peace with Türkiye, what alternatives are there?” he asked pointedly. “Does that mean we should go to war with a country like Türkiye? Do we even understand what we are talking about?” These remarks, while deceptively simple, represent a profound departure from the nationalist orthodoxy that has long governed Armenia’s approach to its western neighbour.

These rhetorical questions do more than expose the impracticality of confrontation; they challenge a decades-long psychological and political framework that equated dialogue with defeatism and any engagement with Türkiye as a betrayal of historical memory. In posing them, Pashinyan is forcing a national reckoning. He is asking Armenians to weigh the cost of sustaining historical grievance against the cost of geopolitical irrelevance. The implication is stark: clinging to victimhood narratives may offer short-term emotional comfort, but it will not ensure Armenia’s long-term viability as a sovereign and prosperous state.

Crucially, this shift is not ideological so much as structural. Armenia’s diplomatic hostility toward Türkiye, now a resurgent regional power, a pivotal NATO member, and a key player in the South Caucasus, is no longer tenable. Geopolitical reality has rendered isolation both unsustainable and strategically reckless. Türkiye plays a decisive role in regional energy, trade, security, and transportation networks, sectors from which Armenia has long excluded itself through self-imposed diplomatic paralysis. Reengagement, therefore, is not a concession; it is a prerequisite for survival.

Pashinyan’s rhetorical pivot also signals a broader transformation in Armenian statecraft, from a reactive foreign policy shaped by diaspora pressures and domestic populism to a more pragmatic, sovereignty-oriented outlook. That such a discourse is emerging now reflects both the cumulative cost of past illusions and the severity of the current predicament. The collapse of the Garabagh project and the rising prominence of regional integration efforts have together created a narrow but urgent window for policy recalibration.

Yet, the Prime Minister’s words alone will not suffice. Normalising relations with Türkiye demands a deep cultural and institutional shift, one that can overcome decades of state-sanctioned trauma, entrenched distrust, and political resistance from nationalist elites. In that sense, Pashinyan’s challenge is not just diplomatic; it is civilisational.

From Moscow’s shadow to uncertain sovereignty

On the regional security front, Pashinyan dropped another bombshell, his growing distance from the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). “It is more likely for Armenia to withdraw from the CSTO than to freeze its membership,” he noted, citing the organisation's failure to meet its obligations.

Armenia has already ceased participation in CSTO activities and has withheld its membership fees. This signals not only disillusionment with Russia but a desire to reorient the country’s security policy away from imperial dependency. Is this radical shift in his political views really happening? Will Armenia's reliance on Russia for years, and its occasional role as a "political pawn or puppet of Russia," truly come to an end?

However, such a pivot is not without its costs. Armenia remains deeply economically dependent on Russia. Its society is still shaped by Kremlin-leaning media and religious institutions, and its oligarchic elite, such as the Karapetyan brothers, many with Russian ties, are actively resisting reforms, endorsing the former government's ideas. Whether Pashinyan can truly wean Armenia off this long-standing dependency remains to be seen.

The peace agreement with Azerbaijan and the only path to survival

Perhaps the most critical development is that the peace agreement with Azerbaijan appears closer than ever. “The text of the Armenia-Azerbaijan project on peace and the establishment of interstate relations has been agreed upon and negotiations on the text have been completed,” Pashinyan declared. What remains is a roadmap, possibly involving initialling the deal, and navigating the internal political fallout.

He also noted that Armenia is ready to simplify the transit regime through its territory and lamented how some factions have painted the reopening of regional railways as a disaster. “I am surprised that some people are trying to present the resumption of railway traffic through the territory of Armenia as a tragedy. The tragedy is that there is no transit railway connection through Armenia,” he emphasised.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has then expressed his confidence in the Abu Dhabi talks as a great platform for the peace process.

"Abu Dhabi was the first meeting where both parties agreed in advance on the agenda for discussions and negotiations," he stated. "The discussion was very productive, and I hope we can continue this conversation in the same format," he expressed.

So is this a real shift in Pashinyan’s political philosophy or just tactical manoeuvring? Only time will tell. But one thing is clear: he recognises that clinging to outdated narratives no longer serves Armenia’s interests. He also knows, painfully, that ignoring the shifting power dynamics of the region has already cost his country dearly.

That is why Armenia must now move from realism in rhetoric to realism in governance. It must normalise ties with its neighbours, especially Türkiye and Azerbaijan, countries that, unlike Russia, are not interested in exploiting Armenia’s vulnerabilities for strategic gain.

This won’t be easy. Armenian society is still deeply traumatised by its past and distrustful of its future. Hatred of Turks is still socially acceptable, and the political class remains split between peacemakers and provocateurs. If recent history is a guide, Pashinyan might find it remarkably difficult to mobilise domestic support to reach his goals in the external arena. Firstly, the majority of the Armenian population still rejects reconciliation with Azerbaijan in the current circumstances. But if there is one thing that can tip the scales, it is leadership.

In that sense, Pashinyan's words are not enough, but they are a start. The peace process is underway. Let us hope that, this time, it is not sabotaged by nostalgia, nor by fear. Perhaps, a crucial element in achieving lasting peace is the proposed change to the referendum, which seems like the only, if not one of the few remaining, unresolved issues. By embracing this change, we can pave the way for a future defined by stability and harmony.

Because peace is not weakness. For Armenia, peace may be its only path to survival.