Armenia's six-point package revealed: So what?
By Orkhan Amashov
Finally, after two weeks of vacillation and tasteless
shilly-shallying in the form of less than crafty stonewalling,
Yerevan has published its six-point offer, first alluded to on 5
May by Armen Gregorian, the Secretary of the Armenian National
Security Council.
And what is this? To be brief, nothing but a reaffirmation of the
old in its regressive mores. Since the document, the full content
of which was revealed by Ambassador-at-Large Edmon Marukyan on 14
May, entails a minimum of two inadmissible points from the
perspective of Baku, it is effectively a counter-offer, not a
complementary list of considerations, as originally purported by
Yerevan.
In a nutshell, the Armenian government still sticks to the formula
whereby it claims to have no territorial pretensions on Azerbaijan
and emphasizes the importance of addressing the rights and security
of Karabakh Armenians in the context of “the final determination of
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh”, attained under the auspices of the
OSCE Minsk Group.
The package was poorly received in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The
sensibility in Baku seems to be that the Armenian side is
prevaricating over the inevitable, whereas the view prevalent in
the anti-government quarters in Yerevan is that the document is
ill-prepared and amounts to the surrender of national
interests.
Ill-conceived inception
First things first. Before making further conclusive remarks, it
behoves one to look into the respective provisions of the package
and to determine the finer elements, if any, upon which a more
detailed examination could be conceived and propitiated.
Point 1 is probably the most obscure element of the document.
Baku’s five-point offer was designed as a collection of proposed
precepts, aimed as a foundation for building a prospective peace
deal around, and one would have reasonably assumed that an Armenian
answer would also follow suit and be “principle-based”.
The point in question merely indicates the specific date on which
the Azerbaijani offer was received – 11 March. Since Baku
communicated its five-point proposal on 21 February, the intention
here is likely to clarify that the document was submitted three
weeks after, thereby placing the blame on an unnamed intermediary,
the identity of which one can guess and make one’s own judicious
conclusion.
Levon Zarubyan, the Vice-Chairman of the Armenian National
Congress, led by former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, was highly
critical of Yerevan’s six-point package, believing that the
document represents a futile and dilettantish attempt to respond to
Baku’s proposal and that its first point is ultimately
unconstructive.
Constructive ambiguity
Point 2 states that Armenia does not have, nor has ever had, any
territorial pretension in relation to Azerbaijan. This, of course,
should not be taken at a face value, but with an industrial-size
vat of salt. The meaning ascribed to this provision is fluid and
tends to acquire slightly modified proclivities, depending on the
exigencies of a given time.
In principle, the original thinking behind this formula has been
based on a construct, enabling Armenia to look plausible in the
eyes of international law without renouncing its claims to
Karabakh. When Yerevan felt strong and bolstered in the past, its
interpretation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan did not
include the Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh Oblast.
From December 2021, this provision gained a new meaning. On 26
December, The beleaguered and irrefutably quixotic Armenian PM
Nikol Pashinyan acknowledged that, from the perspective of
international law, Karabakh was Azerbaijan, and within the
OSCE-mediated format no alternative provenance would ever be
determined.
Whilst addressing the Armenian National Assembly after the 6 April
Brussels summit, Pashinyan emphasised the critical importance of
lowering the bar on “status expectations”, focusing mostly on the
rights and security of Karabakh Armenians.
Against the backdrop of the rhetoric displayed from December 2021
to April 2022, the meaning of “we recognise and have already
recognised Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity” line could, of
course, be interpreted in a way that would incorporate Karabakh.
Yet the Armenian vision regarding this is a long way from
crystallizing into a constant, and thus periodic modifications are
yet to impinge upon the minds of those determining Yerevan's
foreign policy.
Point 3 is a clear example of the aforementioned. It does not
merely emphasise the importance of addressing the subject
concerning the rights and security of Karabakh Armenians, but
specifies that this should be undertaken in the context of the
final determination of the status of the region. Since, in Baku’s
post-war vision, the conflict is over and the status subject is a
relic of the past, this point has no chance of being of
constructive value.
Point 4 does not amount to a principle either. In fact, it says
nothing that could contribute to a peace treaty. Interestingly
enough, if to judge by the Russian translation available, point 4
emphasises the importance of the 2020 ceasefire deal and the
implementation of the 11 January and 26 November statements.
Article 4 of the 10 November deal states that “the peacekeeping
forces of the Russian Federation shall be deployed concurrently
with the withdrawal of the Armenian troops”. This remains
unfulfilled due to Yerevan’s deliberate inaction, and it is of some
import that, when referring to the ceasefire deal, the six-point
proposal merely “emphasises its importance” in general, not “the
importance of its implementation”, as was stated in relation to the
11 January and 26 November statements.
Point 5 refers to the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the
International Pact on Civil and Political Rights. Clairvoyance
skills are unnecessary to appreciate that the latter is included
with the purpose of connecting the question of the rights and
security of Karabakh Armenians with political self-determination.
Point 6 is also doomed to be opposed by Baku, as it ascribes the
misbegotten and archaic OSCE Minsk Group with a central role in
future peace negotiations.
In the final analysis, Yerevan’s proposal could be regarded as
contributing to slackening the zeal engendered in April. It is true
that Azerbaijani demands and Armenian acquiescence have not yet
merged into a domain where the rubrics are firmly established.
Yet there is a clear framework within which an exchange leading to
a peace deal could take place, and a sufficient degree of clarity
on the principal terms to enable forward traction. However, this is
not properly appreciated by large swathes of the Armenian
public.
For instance, Alexander Iskandaryan, the Director of the
Yerevan-based Caucasus Institute, believes Armenia should not rush
to a deal and states that a peace treaty is not always a guarantee
for lasting peace.
The latter part is, in a sense, true. A peace treaty that imposes
unfair terms on the vanquished may indeed lead to even a greater
crisis in the future, as demonstrated in the annals of history. The
question arises as to whether Baku's five points could lead to such
an eventuality.
The point is that the Armenian disinclination to move towards a
comprehensive deal is driven by a desire, dormant in Iskandaryan's
case, to reverse the consequences of the Second Karabakh War as
extensively as possible and to achieve the zenith of
obstreperousness.
Baku and Yerevan see the matter through the prism of different
priorities. Azerbaijan's five-point plan aims to normalise the
fundamentals of interstate relations firstly and then move to the
fate of Karabakh Armenians, and hence Baku views the mutual
recognition of territorial integrity, non-use of force, the
avoidance of territorial pretensions, delimitation, and demarcation
of borders and the opening of communications routes as key
steps.
For Yerevan, the starting point is the fate of the Karabakh
Armenians, and thus classical normalisation within an interstate
framework is something of which Pashinyan's government has yet to
convince itself. As ever, a peace treaty is so near, and yet so
far.
---
Follow us on Twitter @AzerNewsAz