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Akbar Novruz

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The Garabagh conflict has been one of the most complicated issues in modern international law. It sits at the crossroads of fundamental ideals like territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. Ultimately, the idea of territorial integrity won out over the right to self-determination. But ever since that fact, both sides have unfortunately failed to establish a peace agreement with one-another. The parties concluded that in a highly uncertain geopolitical situation, only a sensibly negotiated bilateral agreement could provide a solid and long-term solution. The normalization process, which has been underway for over a year, seems to be now, entering its first transitional phase.

President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan both visit Abu Dhabi on July 9 and will be holding talks on the round-table on 10th of July for the finalization of the peace deal. For Baku, the imperative is straightforward: any peace agreement must secure full international recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity — including definitive border demarcation and sovereignty over the Garabagh region — along with free passage along historic east–west communication corridors connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave. Yerevan, however, is under domestic pressure to obtain strong security guarantees and an international legal framework prior to conceding additional territory or opening transport communications that Armenia fears may strangle its own economic lifelines.

How, when, and where the recent ideas established themselves?

Ever since the war of 2020, consecutive trilateral and bilateral statements brokered by Russia, the European Union and the United States have outlined general roadmaps for reconciliation, confidence-building measures and return of displaced civilians.

Yet even as the guns fell silent, political mistrust hardened. In the years that followed, Russia remained the key security broker, but its position was increasingly undermined by its war in Ukraine and a decline in regional influence. This opened space for the European Union and the United States to step in—though often with conflicting visions and interests.

By mid-2021, the EU launched its own mediation initiative under President of the European Council Charles Michel, convening multiple rounds of Aliyev-Pashinyan talks in Brussels. Meanwhile, Washington hosted high-level meetings between foreign ministers and even convened security-level engagements to build technical momentum on border delimitation and humanitarian access.

Despite the growing number of stakeholders, none of these engagements culminated in a peace treaty. While all sides expressed rhetorical support for reconciliation, the substance often failed to match the symbolism. Azerbaijan accused Armenia of failing to uphold key clauses of the 2020 ceasefire—particularly regarding the full withdrawal of Armenian armed units and the opening of transport links. Armenia, in turn, expressed concern that Baku’s push for immediate technical border delimitation lacked political safeguards and effectively translated into coercive diplomacy.

These tensions deepened in 2022 and 2023, amid flare-ups along the border, disputes over access to the Lachin corridor, and persistent disagreements about legal frameworks. While joint statements were regularly issued—some laying out principles such as mutual recognition of sovereignty—they remained aspirational rather than operational. Azerbaijan rightfully declared her victory over the so called republic in Garabagh after a successful anti-terrorist measure.

The absence of a unified approach among EU member states has made it challenging to implement coherent policies toward the region. In an effort to strengthen its presence, the EU deployed monitoring missions, such as the one sent to the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in 2023, which has made the negotiations more difficult by staying longer than necessary.

The U.S. policy regarding the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict has been both straightforward and inconsistent, balancing the interests of the conflicting parties—Armenia and Azerbaijan—with those of regional powers, particularly Russia. This dual approach has faced criticism for lacking a coherent and effective strategy to address the conflict.

Furthermore, increasing competition between the U.S. and Russia in the region has complicated mediation efforts, diminishing the prospects for effective cooperation to resolve the conflict. Diplomatically, Washington has promoted bilateral initiatives, such as facilitating negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia at the White House in 2022. However, the absence of tangible results has raised questions about the effectiveness of the U.S. strategy in this conflict.

Against this backdrop, the need for a new venue and format became apparent. Moscow’s credibility had eroded; Brussels and Washington were seen as partial actors.

None, however, have resulted in a final peace agreement. Both sides publicly reaffirm their commitment to negotiations, but each new round of talks has revealed profound distrust. The peace agreement announced on March 13, 2025, then has changed everything. Now, direct negotiations are the only way to ensure the agreement is implemented, highlighting the failure of international actors to contribute effectively.

Why Abu Dhabi?

Abu Dhabi's choice is calculated. Its increasing investments in Azerbaijan's energy and Armenia's emerging high‑tech and agriculture sectors show that Abu Dhabi has much to gain from stability on both sides of the Lesser Caucasus. Furthermore, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed's recent discussions with Foreign Ministers Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan highlight the UAE's aspiration to be regarded as an honest broker, not an interested power.

main obstacles and possible breakthroughs

• border delimitation vs. political trust

Baku demands technical, map‑based demarcation as a precondition; Yerevan calls for reciprocal confidence‑building measures, including phased opening of roads and third‑party monitoring, before finalizing any border line.

• transport corridors and economic revival

Azerbaijan’s vision of reopening historic east–west routes through Garabagh promises to boost regional trade and link the Caspian to Europe via the Middle Corridor. Armenia fears that unfettered Azerbaijani control could marginalize its own transport hubs.

• legal guarantees and international arbitration

While the conflict was gradually resolving, Armenia proposed the Alma-Ata Declaration (1991) and the 1970 borders to complicate border demarcation and the signing of a peace treaty. In the context of multilateral commitments, the Alma-Ata Declaration (1991), signed by the former Soviet republics, acknowledged the borders inherited from the USSR and established the principle of uti possidetis juris as a foundation for territorial stability in the region. This principle supports Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in addressing the ongoing conflict. Armenia also seek an external guarantor — perhaps the UN or OSCE — to resolve future disputes; Azerbaijan prefers a streamlined bilateral arbitration mechanism to avoid external interference. As for now, and as they say, for the moment, official Yerevan has come to the conclusion over the past few months, that it also supports the idea of dismissing the OSCE Minsk Group.

Thus, all the situation appears to be perfect for improving negotiations on finalising. If tomorrow's summit produces a definite roadmap — say, a phased timeline for demarcation, and an agreed dispute‑resolution mechanism — it has the potential to turn a decade of stagnation into concrete advances. Even partial agreements on the reopening of chosen border crossings or restarting working groups on energy and tourism would indicate that high‑level talks can unlock the stalemate. broader regional implications.

A successful summit in Abu Dhabi would have repercussions far beyond the South Caucasus. It would signal to Türkiye, Iran, Georgia, and European partners alike that the long era of frozen conflicts might finally be coming to a close, thus opening new avenues for trade, energy cooperation, and people-to-people ties.

Conversely, failure—manifest in a toothless communiqué devoid of concrete results—could cement entrenched hard-line positions in both capitals and invite renewed external meddling. We hope a peace treaty will be signed. However, even if it does not happen, we can assume that any unclear aspects of the treaty will be clarified, and the date and location for its signing will be established. For the United Arab Emirates, hosting a breakthrough would enhance its reputation as a rising diplomatic hub; for Azerbaijan and Armenia, it is one more chance to choose economic prosperity over perpetual conflict.