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Akbar Novruz

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The EU calls its new 64-page agenda with Armenia a “strategic partnership.” In practice, it reads like a political time capsule, one that drags the region back into the pre-2020 mindset and recycles narratives already settled on the ground. After the Washington D.C. Summit and the initialing of the Azerbaijan–Armenia peace agreement, Brussels had an opportunity to solidify progress. Instead, the EU chose to anchor Armenia’s political comfort zone while sidelining the core realities that define today’s South Caucasus.

The “Strategic Agenda for EU–Armenia Partnership,” unveiled after the 6th EU–Armenia Council meeting on December 2, 2025, is extensive and ambitious. The document outlines Yerevan’s vision of political reforms, economic development, institutional capacity-building, and other priorities it seeks to advance with EU support over the next seven years.

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry sharply reacted to the newly signed EU–Armenia Strategic Agenda, stating that several provisions “distort the realities of the post-conflict period and run counter to the overall peace agenda.” This official assessment sets the tone for a wider concern: the document not only misrepresents the dynamics after 2020 but also embeds political narratives that undermine the fragile progress reached since the Washington D.C. summit.

Yet the agenda is notable not only for what it contains, but also for what it omits.

Despite its length, the paper includes no reference to CEPA+, the anticipated upgraded trade agreement, nor any discussion of Armenia’s potential accession to the European Union. Instead, it functions more as an exhaustive catalogue of initiatives the EU and Armenia would like to explore, forming a broad geopolitical umbrella rather than a targeted strategic roadmap.

Azerbaijan appears five times in the document. Two entries, in the introduction and conclusion, explicitly frame the issue of “Garabagh Armenians displaced after Azerbaijan’s military operations” as a central agenda item.

Introduction (p. 4): The EU pledges special attention to “displaced persons and/or refugees of Armenia.”

Conclusion (p. 64): The EU again highlights “the socio-economic integration of Garabagh Armenians displaced after the military operations of Azerbaijan.”

This framing is problematic on multiple levels.

First, it is a political judgment, not a factual assessment. The document does not acknowledge that the relocation of Armenians from Garabagh in 2023 was coordinated by Armenian officials who administered those territories illegally for decades and were funded directly from Yerevan’s state budget.

Second, the agenda ignores the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis expelled from Armenia in the 1990s—an omission that undermines any claim of “balanced humanitarian engagement.”

Third, the language creates a false equivalence, implying that all cases constitute forced displacement, without distinguishing voluntary migration from legally established security operations conducted against illegal armed formations.

The EU has still not clarified what it calls the Armenian population who left Garabagh, “displaced persons,” “refugees,” or some hybrid category. This ambiguity is not accidental; it allows political interpretation rather than legal accuracy.

Yet the document does not explain the actual causes of Azerbaijan’s September 2023 anti-terror measures.

Brussels is fully aware that the operation targeted the remnants of illegal Armenian armed forces, whose continued presence violated international law and all prior agreements. But the agenda refrains from even mentioning this context. Instead, it casually locks together “military operations” and “displacement” as cause and effect, placing the responsibility solely on Azerbaijan while ignoring Armenia’s decades-long policies that shaped the situation.

The agenda’s section on “normalization in the region” pledges support for “the full, immediate, and effective implementation of all relevant ICJ decisions.”

But the document does not specify which ICJ decisions it refers to, an omission that is unlikely to be accidental.

If the reference is to the provisional measures relating to Armenians from Garabagh, then it is unclear why Armenia’s own ICJ-related obligations toward Azerbaijan, including cultural heritage protection and non-discrimination, are left out.

Even more striking is the agenda’s call for the release of “Armenian prisoners.” The individuals in question were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity, not for lawful combat. Calling them “prisoners of war” is both legally inaccurate and politically irresponsible.

Another major concern arises from the EU’s insistence on maintaining and expanding the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA).

Article 7 of the initialed draft peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia explicitly prohibits the deployment of any third-party forces along the border.

Despite this, the EU-Armenia agenda prioritizes the continuation and full operationalization of EUMA, a mission that has frequently been used to promote political narratives rather than contribute to regional stability.

The document also strongly endorses Armenia’s unilateral “Crossroads of Peace” concept, an initiative that lacks regional consensus.

Yet it completely ignores the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which is a multilaterally agreed arrangement and a central component of the August 8 Washington D.C. Summit.

This omission raises a critical question:

Is Armenia genuinely committed to implementing what it signed in Washington, or is it using the EU agenda to dilute those commitments?

The EU–Armenia strategic agenda should have reinforced the momentum achieved since August 8. Instead, it resurrects sensitive issues, embeds political narratives, and questions the sincerity of Armenia’s policy direction.

These provisions not only contradict the principles of the initialed peace agreement but also cast doubt on Armenia's and the EU’s declared support for normalization.

Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry has rightly noted that Baku will monitor the situation closely and draw the necessary conclusions. If the EU and Armenia remain committed to regional peace, then revising or removing these harmful elements must be their next step, not just a diplomatic gesture, but a practical obligation to the future of the region.