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Can Georgia be a platform for direct Baku-Yerevan talks?

27 October 2022 17:57 (UTC+04:00)
Can Georgia be a platform for direct Baku-Yerevan talks?

By Orkhan Amashov

The idea of Georgia hosting direct Azerbaijani-Armenian talks is neither new nor unprecedented. On 16 July, the Azerbaijani and Armenian Foreign Ministers, Jeyhun Bayramov and Ararat Mirzoyan, met in Tbilisi, via the good offices of their Georgian counterpart, Ilia Darchiashvili.

During the European Political Community Summit in Prague on 6 October, President Ilham Aliyev proposed the idea of establishing a single discussion platform in the trilateral format of the three South Caucasian nations in order to ensure peace and stability in the region. On 24 October, the Azerbaijani leader reiterated this idea during his one-day trip to Georgia and received the firm backing of Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili.

The suggested platform, of course, entails a wider consultation design, aiming at tapping into the common interests of the region with the prospect of this being consolidated into a united force in the fullness of time. This could also be viewed as a transitory phase, paving the way for a future “3+3” format, with Russia, Türkiye, and Russia joining the club in due course. One can also argue that it could be a precursor to what the Georgian PM envisaged as a “3+2” platform, with the US and the EU being involved.

On a more specific level, for the purpose of the Azerbaijani-Armenian post-conflict normalisation process, the prospect of Georgia being a venue for regular and intensive talks is attractive on several accounts.

Firstly, once the proposal receives Armenian support, it will have every chance of assuming the form of a pervasive internal Caucasian design. The platform in no way militates against the mediatory efforts of Brussels and Moscow but occupies the place of a shortcut tier in a comprehensive architecture of multilayered negotiations, well-equipped to ensure the swift exchange of views and the achievement of quick decisions.

Secondly, the platform may constitute the closest design to what one may call a bilateral format, with Georgia fulfilling a facilitatory function. Both the Moscow and Brussels formats are constructed in such a way that major initiatives come from the mediators, with Baku and Yerevan expected to respond positively. The third trilateral meeting in the EU capital on 6 April was lauded at the time as the nascent birth of a direct Baku-Yerevan process, although subsequent developments have not yet lived up to the initial promise.

Here, the suggestion comes from Baku and, if firmly seconded by Yerevan, could evolve into a trilateral South Caucasian consultation mechanism on wider regional issues and a direct Azerbaijani-Armenian communication route, with Tbilisi acting as the coordinator. This suggests a certain degree of elasticity and maneuverability in the negotiations, with bilateral talks occurring frequently and at different levels. There has already been Georgian involvement in facilitating a detainees-for-minefield-maps deal between Baku and Yerevan, thereby setting a precedent.

Thirdly, as the Brussels and Moscow formats have reiterated the competing geopolitical interests of the EU and Russia, this has led to some fragmentation of the post-conflict agenda. In fact, the Tbilisi platform has a promise of simplicity, engendered by a relatively straightforward set of interests.

Brussels and Moscow differ in their ways of envisaging what a peaceful and prosperous South Caucasus could mean and how such an eventuality could be achieved. It is undeniable that Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia have their differences, but because they are entitled to a shared internal perceptive, the likelihood of their finding common ground through active exchanges could be expected to be higher.

On the point of competition, one advantage of Georgia’s active role in the Azerbaijani-Armenian process could also be that it will have not a direct counterweight, as is the case with the mediatory efforts of Moscow and Brussels.

Fourthly, President Aliyev’s proposal is structured on a long-term vision and, therefore, entails a strong sense of permanence. The whole concept is beyond reaching a peaceful solution to Baku-Yerevan discrepancies but to gradually entrench a groundwork for holistic regional integration. This means that it is not a design swirling around one particular objective, but part of deep strategic thinking.

Both the Brussels and Moscow platforms are ad hoc in their nature and should cease to exist once Azerbaijan and Armenia reach a sustainable and comprehensive deal. However, the South Caucasian format is a long-term project wherein a firm peace between Baku and Yerevan is the critical springboard towards achieving subsequent objectives.

Presently, the state of affairs involving Azerbaijani-Armenian dynamics is so superficially volatile that it can be difficult to discern some positive undercurrents. Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine has slackened the zeal of its mediatory efforts, with President Vladimir Putin’s invitation addressed to the Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders to meet in Sochi in late October being viewed as a possible non-event, serving to only strengthen the Kremlin’s sense of primacy.

Brussels is active. Its civilian mission sent to Armenia naturally received a frosty reaction in Azerbaijan, as the latter is of the opinion that its mandate agreed upon in Prague on 6 October does not correspond with the 17 October decision of the EU Council, which appears to attribute a grander status to what was envisaged to be a technical assessment group. In the meantime, Washington has been pursuing its own line, apparently with some cooperation with Brussels, yet nonetheless independently, focusing on bringing the sides to a final peace deal on fundamental points, presumably sparing some of the minutiae impacting multi-tracked negotiations.

In the light of all these, President Aliyev’s proposal to interact within the trilateral platform of the three regional actors offers some clarity, augmenting the vital South Caucasian ingredient of the wider geopolitical connectivity map. After all, this is not the search for a new mediator for the Azerbaijani-Armenian process, but an attempt to find a shortcut for direct bilateral talks, an objective that both the Moscow and Brussels formats have failed to achieve. As Neil Watson, a British journalist, commented: “The Georgian option is logical and lacks the self-interest of the Brussels and Moscow formats. Peace in the South Caucasus is desirable for all three nations and this could very well be achieved.”

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