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Akbar Novruz

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Iran’s political hardliners have entered a familiar cycle once again: whenever diplomacy between Baku and Tehran gains momentum, anti-Azerbaijan narratives suddenly intensify in Iran’s media and political circles, which is a definite thing that occurs every now and then. The louder the anti-Azerbaijan rhetoric becomes, the clearer it is that some forces in Tehran are struggling to accept the new geopolitical landscape. Instead of adapting to reality, these circles have chosen to revive old narratives and invent new crises at a time when regional cooperation is actually moving forward.

The visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahid Jalalzadeh to Baku has once again highlighted the contrasting paths of official diplomacy and the increasingly hostile rhetoric adopted by certain political circles inside Iran. While Jalalzadeh’s meetings with Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov focused on cooperation in political, economic, trade, transportation and energy security spheres, anti-Azerbaijani voices in Iran intensified their propaganda on the eve of the visit. This duality reflects a pattern that has become familiar in recent years, particularly after Azerbaijan’s victory in the Patriotic War.

According to the information released after the meeting, both sides reiterated the importance of Azerbaijani-Iranian cooperation and discussed a number of transport and communication projects that play a significant role in regional connectivity. The development of corridors passing through the South Caucasus remains an important factor for both countries, and the discussions in Baku were aimed at strengthening these shared interests.

Yet even as the diplomats were focusing on regional stability, anti-Azerbaijan circles in Iran were attempting to undermine the atmosphere of cooperation. One of the most active figures among these groups, Ahmad Kazemi, published another provocative article on his personal blog, alleging that Baku, Ankara and Yerevan had reached secret agreements directed against Iran. He also claimed that Azerbaijan intends to draw Tehran into geopolitical manipulation by reshaping negotiations with Armenia. According to Kazemi, even the population decline in the Zangazur region is supposedly linked to Azerbaijan’s long-term plans. These accusations are not supported by any evidence and are clearly aimed at creating an atmosphere of fear within Iran.

Similar narratives were echoed by Alireza Nesari from the Iranian parliament’s Construction Commission. In his interview with Khabarfori, Nesari described the recent Armenia–United States agreement as a political threat to Iran. He also referred to the incomplete 107-kilometre section of the Zangazur route in Iranian territory, insisting that Iran should speed up construction to force regional transport flow through its borders. His statements reveal the insecurity felt by a segment of Iran’s political establishment regarding regional transport projects that do not align solely with Tehran’s interests.

The information pressure campaign did not end there. Iran’s media space has been seized with hysteria following the military parade held in Baku on the anniversary of Victory Day on November 8. Several Iranian outlets claimed that the military equipment showcased during the parade posed a direct threat to Iran. Mashregh News even described all the weapons as Israeli-made, although many of them were produced in China and Russia. This attempt to link Azerbaijan’s defence capabilities exclusively with Israel is a recurring theme in Tehran’s information strategy.

At the heart of this rhetoric lie three fundamental anxieties in Tehran:

First, Iran’s political circles struggle with Azerbaijan’s assertive and independent foreign policy. Baku maintains balanced relations with major global centres of power, cooperates deeply with Türkiye, and engages constructively with Western institutions. For some in Iran’s establishment, this represents a threat to Tehran’s narrative of regional hierarchy and ideological influence.

Second, segments of Iran’s political sphere continue using ethnic and historical myths to justify interference in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs. By amplifying unfounded claims about demographic trends, cultural identity or “population manipulation,” these circles attempt to shape perceptions among Iranian Azerbaijanis, particularly in regions where cultural affinity with Azerbaijan is historically strong.

Third, Iran remains uncomfortable with the new balance of power in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan’s restoration of territorial integrity altered decades-old dynamics, and its emergence as a central actor in regional security and connectivity challenges Iran’s long-standing assumption that it was the uncontested gateway between East and West. In reality, new routes like the Zangazur corridor would benefit Iran economically as well, providing an additional land link at a time when sanctions have severely limited its access to global markets.

Yet Iranian hardliners selectively ignore these practical advantages. Instead, they frame Azerbaijan’s partnerships as existential threats, while overlooking the fact that improved connectivity would reduce transportation costs for Iranian exporters and diversify access to Europe and Asia.

This contradiction highlights a broader problem: certain Iranian actors prefer a confrontational narrative not because of genuine threats, but because it preserves outdated geopolitical assumptions. Accepting the new realities of the South Caucasus would require admitting that regional influence is no longer unipolar, and that Azerbaijan is now shaping events rather than reacting to them.

Despite these realities, anti-Azerbaijan groups in Iran attempt to portray the corridor as a geopolitical threat. Their narrative ignores the economic benefits and focuses instead on preserving old geopolitical habits. Instead of adapting to a new environment that could bring prosperity to the region, these circles cling to outdated fears and promote misinformation.

The renewed wave of accusations in Iran’s political and media space must therefore be viewed as part of a broader attempt by anti-Azerbaijan groups to resist the new geopolitical realities of the South Caucasus. Their rhetoric does not reflect official Iranian diplomacy, nor does it align with the long-term interests of the Iranian people, who would benefit from improved transport routes and stronger economic ties.

Azerbaijan remains committed to regional cooperation, connectivity and stability. What is being presented as concern for regional security is, in truth, nothing more than an attempt to disrupt the new balance emerging after Azerbaijan’s victories. But propaganda has its limits. The facts on the ground, the diplomatic processes underway and the economic logic of regional cooperation all point in one direction. The louder anti-Azerbaijan circles in Iran shout, the more they reveal their discomfort with a reality they can no longer shape.

Anti-Azerbaijan rhetoric may buy headlines in Tehran, but it cannot stop the realities that are already transforming the South Caucasus.