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Akbar Novruz

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As Azerbaijan pushes forward with its peace agenda and reconstruction efforts, recently, a striking imbalance has recently emerged in the international response, particularly from Europe. During the years of occupation, the European Union and various European organisations regularly introduced peacebuilding programs, civil society initiatives, and grant-based projects, many of which ultimately helped maintain the existing status quo rather than resolve the conflict. Yet now, in a period when Azerbaijan has restored its sovereignty, opened the path for normalisation with Armenia, and is addressing the immense humanitarian and infrastructural consequences of occupation, Europe’s involvement has sharply declined.

Azerbaijan today finances almost the entirety of its demining operations alone, despite more than 20 per cent of its territory being left in ruins and heavily contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance. Only a handful of states, such as Uzbekistan and Pakistan, have provided meaningful assistance. Europe, which once showed sustained interest and even competition in peace initiatives during the conflict, now demonstrates near-total passivity. This is particularly evident when contrasted with the EU’s vigorous political, financial, humanitarian, and reconstruction support for Ukraine.

Azerbaijan, despite this discrepancy, has not withheld its own assistance to Ukraine, raising questions about why Europe applies a selective, asymmetric standard in its approach to post-conflict recovery. While the EU invests heavily in Ukrainian reconstruction and mine clearance, it has not initiated even a single substantial reconstruction or demining project in Azerbaijan. This selective engagement not only undermines Europe’s credibility but also reinforces doubts about its intentions and priorities in the South Caucasus.

The current reality invites discussion on whether Europe has strategically distanced itself from a peace process in which Azerbaijan now holds the initiative, and whether this withdrawal risks weakening regional stability. At the same time, new regional platforms, such as the Zangazur corridor and broader connectivity projects, present opportunities for meaningful support in energy, transport, reconstruction, and humanitarian fields. Yet Europe remains detached, prompting sharper questions about its future role, its geopolitical principles, and its long-term vision for the region.

“Europe has abandoned the South Caucasus at the very moment when real peace became possible,” British political scientist Neil Watson told Azernews, before outlining his assessment:

“To regain credibility and relevance in the South Caucasus, the EU should establish a dedicated EU Recovery and Demining Fund for the Azerbaijani region of Garabagh, focusing on rebuilding critical infrastructure, schools, and agriculture in the liberated territories, thereby making a public and symbolic commitment. The EU should support the Zangazur Corridor, also known as the Trump International Corridor for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), not just as a transport route, but as a blueprint for regional connectivity, energy diversification away from Russia, and a path towards a stable and interconnected South Caucasus, which has the potential to become essential in the New World Order. The EU must appoint a Special Envoy for the South Caucasus, embedding the region into the EU’s strategic agenda, rather than treating it as a peripheral issue. Brussels should invest in the digital and green transformation of the region before China, Türkiye, or the Gulf states dominate this space. It is also important to launch a Brussels-Garabagh Dialogue Platform involving Armenian and Azerbaijani civil society, moderated by EU institutions, thereby playing a moral and diplomatic balancing role.”

Watson continued:

“EU foreign policy is more about inertia and optics than principle. Armenia was seen as the so-called ‘victim’ as it fitted the EU’s preferred narrative of a fragile Christian democracy needing support. When Azerbaijan regained control of its internationally recognised territories, it ceased to be the underdog and used the Russian expansionist mentality to its advantage. Europe struggles to engage with strong, assertive partners who don’t follow its playbook. Geopolitical bias played a role — especially under pressure from Armenocentric France, which heavily influenced the policy stance in Brussels.”

He added, and in the conclusion, warned that the EU has a choice:

“The EU only supports peace when it’s convenient and beneficial to it. EU neutrality is selective. It doesn’t protect principles; it protects narratives. This has undermined the EU’s image as a reliable peacebroker and shifted trust toward alternative power centres like Türkiye. The ultimate message is dangerous: ‘Strength and sovereignty won’t be rewarded, unless they align with EU preferences. Europe has a choice: reclaim its influence by being bold and fair, or remain a spectator in a region moving toward new alliances. Azerbaijan has played its hand. The South Caucasus is united and independent of Russian domination for the first time.”