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By Punhan Sariyev | AzerNews

The intersection of religion and diplomacy has throughout history been a source of contradictions, antagonism, and ambiguous perceptions. In particular, the tendency of religious authorities towards sectarianism and radicalism brings them into a somewhat isolated position. Iran has always shared historical and cultural commonality with Azerbaijan – this is an undeniable fact, but the view of the issue through a religious prism takes on a rather different shape. For the sake of simple explanation, let us, for now, refrain from delving deep into history. I shall simply provide clarification regarding the latest argument of Ali Akbar Velayati, the senior adviser to Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, who has frequently dominated the agenda with statements designed to stir the waters. Velayati claims that he rejects the summit of Israeli rabbis held in Azerbaijan, and considers this step, in his own words, as one against Islam, as well as against the global reputation of Shiism. He further underlines, almost between the lines, that Azerbaijanis are of Muslim origin, recalling their 1,200 years of Islamic history. This is indeed a significant diplomatic remark, yet it does not overlap to any great extent with Iran’s sectarian outlook.

First of all, it should be noted that during the early centuries of Islam (7th–10th centuries), the majority of Iran’s population were simply Muslims adhering to Sunnah. Shiism, by contrast, existed largely as a minority current. The strengthening of this current is connected with the Safavid state (1501–1736). In other words, it was precisely in this period that Shiism acquired the status of state religion. In 1501, Shah Ismail Khatai Safavid came to power and declared Twelver Shiism (the Jafari school) the official religion of the state. This step led to the mass spread of Shiism in Iran and set Iran at odds with the Sunni Ottoman state.

In my view, this brief historical excursion is sufficient for now. The fact itself simply holds up a mirror to Velayati’s conflation of Islam with sectarianism. Iran uses Shiism not only within the country but also as a political instrument across the region. According to the concept of velayat-e faqih, the religious leader stands at the head of both religious and political authority. Through Shiism, Iran has extended its sphere of influence into countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. In short, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, a monarchy was toppled in a country that had been somewhat secularised, and the Islamic Republic of Iran was established. Shiism became the principal ideological pillar of the state. In the constitution, Twelver Ja‘fari Shiism was enshrined as the official sect.

So what, then, is Iran’s real concern?

In recent years, Azerbaijan has demonstrated its independent diplomatic course with greater clarity and determination. In this process, its cooperation with Turkiye, Israel, Western states and regional partners has deepened. This, in turn, increases Tehran’s unease. Iran’s portrayal of the Israeli rabbi summit in Azerbaijan as an “anti-Islamic step” and its labelling of Baku’s possible approach towards the Abraham Accords as a “blow to the prestige of Shiism” are, in fact, rooted in several strategic and ideological factors.

Firstly, the ideological factor. Iran sees itself as the principal guardian of Shiism and seeks to maintain ideological control over Shia communities around the world. Azerbaijan, however, despite a certain segment of its population being Shia, applies a secular model of statehood and does not elevate religion onto the political plane. Therefore, in Tehran’s view, the more independent diplomatic steps Azerbaijan takes, the weaker Iran’s position as a “centre of Shiism” becomes.

Secondly, the Israel factor, which makes Azerbaijan’s cooperation with Israel – one of Iran’s greatest strategic rivals – a sensitive subject for Tehran. Baku cooperates with Israel in the fields of energy, technology and defence, and this contradicts Tehran’s conception of regional balance. The summit of Israeli religious leaders in Azerbaijan, in Iran’s eyes, is not simply a diplomatic event, but rather the consolidation of its enemy’s foothold in the region.

Thirdly, the matter is linked to the Abraham Accords. Iran regards these agreements as acts of “betrayal” by Arab countries normalising relations with Israel and as moves against itself. The possibility of Azerbaijan moving closer to this process could deepen Tehran’s isolation. Therefore, by presenting it as a “blow to Shiism”, Tehran is in reality seeking to safeguard its regional geopolitical interests.

Fourthly, the regional power balance. As Azerbaijan pursues an independent diplomacy and strengthens its integration with the West, Turkiye and Central Asia, Iran’s influence narrows. Moreover, Azerbaijan’s secular model of development may serve as an alternative example for the millions of Azerbaijanis living in Iran, which poses a risk to Tehran’s domestic stability.

Finally, the domestic political factor is also of crucial importance here. The Iranian leadership makes use of external “threats” to compensate for crises of legitimacy and social discontent within the country. Azerbaijan’s rapprochement with Israel is, in this sense, exploited as a propaganda tool internally – Tehran presents this both in the light of religious zeal and in terms of national security. A simple comparison of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s moderate stance in regional policy with the views of Supreme Leader Khamenei is quite sufficient. On the one hand, a theocratic authority isolated in the world and drawing hatred from its domestic audience; on the other, a regime making wide use of such tactics in order not to be completely excluded from regional relations. Yet since the fundamental principle of the state is built upon Shiism, it cannot remain indifferent to sensitive subjects.

Iran’s reaction is not confined purely to religious motives. It is a fusion of claims to ideological hegemony, regional rivalry and domestic political calculations. As Azerbaijan consolidates itself as an independent actor, Iran’s room for manoeuvre narrows, and Tehran responds with harsher rhetoric. In essence, this confrontation is an indication of which model will prevail in the future geopolitical order of the Caucasus: the Azerbaijani model based on secular and independent diplomacy, which is in harmony with progressive world politics, or the Iranian model that seeks to remain as a centre of religious-ideological influence.

Photo by Dohainstitute.org