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Akbar Novruz

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Armenia has been seeking ways to emerge from its self-isolation for some time now. Lately, ideas and projects such as the Middle Corridor, Zangazur Corridor, and North-South Corridor have come to the forefront, with Azerbaijan playing an important role. This initiative has found itself as a trend in Yerevan for almost half a decade.

This time, Armenia found a new way by officially joining the Ashgabat Agreement, a long-standing but underdeveloped framework aimed at creating an international transport and transit corridor between Iran, the Sultanate of Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The decision, approved by the Armenian government on May 8, underscores Yerevan’s desire to integrate into regional transport initiatives and secure a foothold in broader trade networks that bypass Azerbaijan.

The Ashgabat Agreement, originally signed in 2011, aims to establish reliable and efficient multimodal transport corridors—integrating road, rail, and sea—across member states. It seeks to facilitate the movement of goods and passengers, reduce logistics costs, harmonise customs procedures, and increase the transit profile of participating countries. Though Qatar, one of the initial signatories, withdrew in 2013, the agreement gradually expanded to include Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and India in later years. However, real progress in implementation has remained modest. The agreement, which officially came into force in 2016, has since been joined by India, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan. However, despite its legal status, the project has seen limited practical development over the past decade, with implementation efforts only accelerating slightly after 2020.

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, a number of Eurasian states began actively searching for alternative corridors that circumvent Russia. The Ashgabat route, in theory, provides a viable connection between Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, and potentially Europe, though infrastructure, tariffs, and geopolitical alignments continue to pose challenges. In 2021 and 2022, coordination meetings led to the signing of a Final Additional Protocol by Turkmenistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, addressing issues like visa simplification, unified transit tariffs, and fee harmonisation.

Iran, a central player in this initiative, has been especially active in recent years, seeking to maximise its geographic leverage over Eurasian transit flows. Iranian officials, including Alireza Enayati of the Foreign Ministry, have repeatedly emphasised Tehran’s intent to operationalise the Iran-Oman-Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan corridor, though no concrete timeline has been announced. Turkmenistan’s decision in 2022 to allow foreign freight transport across its territory has partially facilitated this vision.

Amid these developments, Armenia’s interest in the agreement is both political and strategic. Participation provides access to new logistics platforms, potential concessions from fellow member states, and, importantly, symbolic involvement in a corridor that does not include Azerbaijan. Yerevan has long sought inclusion in the North-South International Transport Corridor, which links India, Iran, Russia, and Europe, and its alignment with Tehran and New Delhi further reinforces this goal. According to the Armenian government, joining the agreement aligns with Yerevan’s ambition to secure access to international markets, harmonise transit documentation, and simplify customs procedures. The Armenian side also sees the project as consistent with its “Crossroads of the World” initiative and potentially complementary to its aim of joining the North-South transport corridor—an initiative already being realised through active cooperation between Azerbaijan, Iran, and other regional states.

Yet the practical impact of Armenia’s participation remains uncertain. Despite over a decade since its inception, the Ashgabat Agreement corridor has not yet transformed into a fully functioning logistics network. Competing priorities among member states, a lack of investment, and logistical inefficiencies continue to limit its scope. Unlike the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor (TITR) or the North-South corridor, where Azerbaijan plays a pivotal role and significant cargo movement is already underway, the Ashgabat Agreement remains largely aspirational.

In contrast, Azerbaijan continues to focus on operational and expanding infrastructure projects. Unlike the Ashgabat Agreement, which remains in a semi-functional state despite recent meetings and protocol, both the North-South and East-West corridors, in which Baku is deeply embedded, are already delivering tangible results. With ongoing investments in Baku International Sea Trade Port, rail networks, and the anticipated Zangazur Corridor, Azerbaijan remains at the centre of practical transit routes in the region. In fact, should the Ashgabat corridor ever become operational, it may eventually rely on Azerbaijani infrastructure, particularly if peace with Armenia paves the way for integrating the Zangezur Corridor into wider Eurasian transit networks.

Moreover, the proliferation of corridor initiatives—ranging from the China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe route to the ATR-backed rail link from China to Austria via the Caspian—underscores increasing regional fragmentation. These multiple overlapping corridors, often driven by competing ambitions among Central Asian states, expose the deep rivalries between countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. For example, Kazakhstan’s dominant position in the EU-backed Middle Corridor has reportedly irritated its southern neighbours, who are now seeking alternatives to reduce dependency on Astana.

Iran, for its part, is using its proximity and strategic access to the Persian Gulf to draw countries into multilateral transport frameworks where it plays a central role. With Oman and Uzbekistan actively participating, and support from India for the North-South corridor, Iran is positioning itself as a regional logistics hub. However, progress hinges on diplomatic normalisation with the West, particularly with the United States, where sanctions remain a key obstacle.

From Baku’s perspective, Armenia’s entry into a corridor that is not yet operational poses no immediate strategic challenge. In fact, should the Ashgabat corridor become viable, its eventual connection to infrastructure such as the Zangazur corridor—pending peace between Baku and Yerevan—could benefit all parties, including Armenia itself. For now, however, Baku remains firmly rooted in corridors that are already redefining the region’s transit map.