Unconventional monetary policy on stilts
By Nouriel Roubini
With most advanced economies experiencing anemic recoveries from
the 2008 financial crisis, their central banks have been forced to
move from conventional monetary policy – reducing policy rates via
open-market purchases of short-term government bonds – to a range
of unconventional policies. Although the zero nominal bound on
interest rates – previously only a theoretical possibility – had
been reached and zero-interest-rate policy (ZIRP) had been
implemented, growth remained anemic. So central banks embraced
measures that didn’t even exist in their policy toolkit a decade
ago. And now they are poised to do so again.
The list of unconventional measures has been extensive. There was
quantitative easing (QE), or purchases of long-term government
bonds, once short-term rates were already zero. This was
accompanied by credit easing (CE), which took the form of
central-bank purchases of private or semi-private assets – such as
mortgage- and other asset-backed securities, covered bonds,
corporate bonds, real-estate trust funds, and even equities via
exchange-traded funds. The aim was to reduce private credit spreads
(the difference between yields on private assets and those on
government bonds of similar maturity) and to boost, directly and
indirectly, the price of other risky assets such as equities and
real estate.
Then there was “forward guidance” (FG), the commitment to keep
policy rates at zero for longer than economic fundamentals
justified, thereby further reducing shorter-term interest rates.
For example, committing to maintain zero policy rates for, say,
three years implies that interest rates on securities with up to a
three-year maturity should also fall to zero, given that
medium-term interest rates are based on expectations concerning
short-term rates over the next three years. Capping things off,
there was unsterilized currency-market intervention to boost
exports via a weaker currency.
These policies did indeed reduce long- and medium-term interest
rates on government securities and mortgage bonds. They also
narrowed credit spreads on private assets, boosted the stock
market, weakened the currency, and reduced real interest rates by
increasing inflation expectations. So they were partly
effective.
Still, in most advanced economies, growth (and inflation) remained
stubbornly low. There was no shortage of reasons for this. Given
deleveraging from high private and public debts, unconventional
monetary policies could prevent severe recessions and outright
deflation; but they could not bring about robust growth and 2%
inflation.
Moreover, the policy mix was suboptimal. While monetary policy can
play an important role in boosting growth and inflation, structural
policies are needed to increase potential growth and keep firms,
households, banks, and government from turning into zombies,
chronically unable to spend because of too much debt. And fiscal
policies were also necessary to support aggregate demand.
Unfortunately, the political economy of most structural reforms –
with their front-loaded costs and back-loaded benefits – implies
that they occur only slowly. At the same time, fiscal policy has
been constrained in some countries by high deficits and debts
(which jeopardize market access), and in others (the eurozone, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, for example) by a political
backlash against further fiscal stimulus, leading to austerity
measures that undermine short-term growth. So, like it or not,
central banks became and still are the only game in town when it
comes to supporting aggregate demand, lifting employment, and
preventing deflation.
As a result, unconventional monetary policies – entrenched now for
almost a decade – have themselves become conventional. And, in view
of persistent lackluster growth and deflation risk in most advanced
economies, monetary policymakers will have to continue their lonely
fight with a new set of “unconventional unconventional” monetary
policies.
Some have already been implemented. For example, negative interest
policy rates (NIRPs) are now standard in Switzerland, Sweden,
Denmark, the eurozone, and Japan, where the excess reserves that
banks hold with central banks as a result of QE are taxed with a
negative rate. Policymakers have shifted from working on the
quantity of money (QE, CE, and foreign-exchange intervention) to
working on the price of money (first ZIRP, then FG, and now NIRP).
Nominal interest rates are now negative not only for overnight
debt, but also for ten-year government bonds. Indeed, about $6
trillion worth of government bonds around the world today have
negative nominal yields.
The next stage of unconventional unconventional monetary policy –
if the risks of recession, deflation and financial crisis sharply
increase – could have three components. First, central banks could
tax cash to prevent banks from attempting to avoid the
negative-rate tax on excess reserves. With banks unable to switch
into cash (thereby earning zero rates), central banks could go even
more negative with policy rates.
Second, QE could evolve into a “helicopter drop” of money or direct
monetary financing by central banks of larger fiscal deficits.
Indeed, the recent market buzz has been about the benefits of
permanent monetization of public deficits and debt. Moreover, while
QE has benefited holders of financial assets by boosting the prices
of stocks, bonds, and real estate, it has also fueled rising
inequality. A helicopter drop (through tax cuts or transfers
financed by newly printed money) would put money directly into the
hands of households, boosting consumption.
Third, credit easing by central banks, or purchases of private
assets, could broaden significantly. Think of direct purchases of
stocks, high-risk corporate bonds, and banks’ bad loans.
If unconventional unconventional monetary policies sound a little
crazy, it’s worth remembering that the same was said about
“conventional unconventional” policies just a few years ago. And if
current conditions in the advanced economies remain entrenched a
decade from now, helicopter drops, debt monetization, and taxation
of cash may turn out to be the new QE, CE, FG, ZIRP, and NIRP.
Desperate times call for desperate measures.
Copyright: Project Syndicate: Unconventional Monetary Policy on Stilts
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