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Qabil Ashirov

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Iran’s Assembly of Experts has brought a consequential question into the centre of the country’s political debate: whether Tehran should reconsider its membership in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), revise its defence doctrine and strengthen its deterrence capabilities. Issued on November 12, the statement comes from a body constitutionally responsible for selecting and overseeing the Supreme Leader. It signals a debate about the foundations of national security. Why has this issue become so urgent? Two strategic interpretations offer possible answers.

The first is an optimistic scenario, viewed from Tehran’s perspective. Iran may believe that the international balance of power gives Washington strong incentives to avoid a full-scale war. The United States faces simultaneous strategic demands in Europe, where Russia’s war against Ukraine continues to shape security calculations, and in the Indo-Pacific, where tensions surrounding Taiwan remain central to its competition with China. Friction between Washington and European capitals further complicates Western coordination. A major ground war against Iran would absorb military resources, political attention and diplomatic capital while American policymakers manage several competing theatres.

For Tehran, this calculation creates room for coercive diplomacy. Iran may judge that Washington has the capacity to conduct limited air and missile strikes, cyber operations and targeted attacks, while a prolonged invasion and occupation would carry a far greater strategic cost. Iran’s air-defence network has faced serious challenges against technologically advanced American and Israeli air forces. Strikes on nuclear and military facilities have exposed the vulnerability of fixed infrastructure, while Tehran’s ability to prevent attacks deep inside its territory remains constrained. Its missile and drone arsenal offers retaliation options, yet provides limited protection against incoming air power.

Against this background, raising the prospect of NPT withdrawal could serve as leverage. Tehran may be signalling that continued military pressure will push the nuclear question into a more dangerous phase, while a negotiated arrangement could preserve a path away from escalation. The objective would be to bring Washington back to the negotiating table by increasing the diplomatic, economic and security costs of its current approach. In this scenario, the Assembly’s statement is primarily a bargaining signal: Iran seeks recognition of its security concerns, limits on future attacks and sanctions relief in exchange for restraint in its nuclear choices.

The second scenario is more pessimistic. It assumes that Iran’s leadership has long regarded a nuclear weapon as an ultimate guarantee of state security, while gradually building the technological foundations. A nuclear weapon requires fissile material, weapon design, engineering and a reliable delivery capability, with development spanning years and generations of specialists. Iran’s strategy may therefore have involved building the scientific and industrial base while keeping the final political decision open.

This interpretation gives particular significance to the religious prohibition associated with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s second Supreme Leader. His position against nuclear weapons became a central element of the Islamic Republic’s public doctrine. One possible reading is that the religious ruling also served a political function: it helped contain international pressure and preserve diplomatic space while Iran expanded its enrichment programme, technical expertise and missile capabilities. This remains an interpretation, rather than an established explanation of the ruling’s original purpose. The historical record is more complicated: a 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate assessed that Iran had halted its organised nuclear-weapons programme in 2003, while retaining the option to develop weapons and continuing work on relevant technical capabilities.

Over the following decades, Iran developed a substantial missile arsenal, including systems with ranges of up to approximately 2,000 kilometres, alongside a large drone industry. Its uranium-enrichment programme also advanced significantly. These capabilities form separate parts of a potential deterrent architecture: enriched uranium provides the material pathway, scientific expertise supports weapon development, and missiles offer a possible delivery platform. Their existence, however, leaves open the central question of whether Iran has assembled a nuclear warhead or completed the engineering required for deployment.

The death of Ali Khamenei in the bombardment, followed by the succession of his son Mojtaba, adds a further political dimension. The religious authority most closely associated with the nuclear prohibition has disappeared from the centre of the system. Tehran’s leadership could use his death, alongside attacks on Iranian territory, to shape domestic opinion around national vulnerability and the need for a stronger deterrent. Internationally, Iran could present a doctrinal shift as a response to military pressure and the failure of existing security arrangements.

These scenarios lead towards different destinations. In the first, nuclear ambiguity is a negotiating instrument designed to secure restraint from Washington. In the second, the current debate reflects a possible transition towards an actual nuclear-weapons capability. The Assembly of Experts’ statement leaves both interpretations open. Its significance lies in the fact that Iran’s leadership is publicly debating the relationship between nuclear policy, military vulnerability and national survival.