Azernews.Az

Fitch Ratings has announced that the planned balance sheet clean-up and subsequent privatisation of International Bank of Azerbaijan (IBA, BB/Stable/b-) could be moderately positive for the bank's credit profile and ratings.

The actual impact will depend primarily on (i) the completeness of the clean-up, ie the extent to which Fitch views the bank's asset quality and capitalization as having strengthened as a result; and (ii) the relationships between the state, the bank's new shareholder(s) and IBA following privatisation, and how these may influence the likelihood of government support.

Fitch will review the bank's ratings when more information becomes available on the planned asset sale and privatization, according to the July 21 report.

On 15 July, the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, signed a decree on measures to restore IBA's financial position in order to prepare the bank for privatization.

If IBA is able to sell the bulk of its impaired and high-risk assets at (or close to) book value, this could result in an upgrade of the bank's 'b-' Viability Rating (VR). The VR at present primarily reflects the bank's weak capitalisation and asset quality. However, uncertainty remains about the specific assets to be transferred, their amount, and the price that will be paid for them.

Fitch believes that IBA's problem assets are substantial, despite reported NPLs (non-performing loans, 90 days overdue) and rolled-over loans being equal to only a moderate 7.2% and 6.6% of end-2014 gross loans, respectively.

Fitch estimates that other high risk loans among IBA's largest exposures, including project finance lending to start-up businesses and construction loans with sizeable grace periods, were approximately AZN1bn (11% of gross loans) at end-1Q15. Additional asset quality and corporate governance issues stem from the legacy promissory notes portfolio (around AZN700m, net of impairment reserves), which is largely exposed to construction projects in Russia with high non-completion risks. Reserve coverage of NPLs was a reasonable 135% at end-2014, but rolled-over loans, large high-risk exposures and the promissory note portfolio combined exceeded 3x end-2014 Fitch Core Capital (FCC).

IBA's regulatory Tier 1 capital ratio was a moderate 7.7% at end-March 2015, while the FCC ratio is likely to have fallen significantly from 7.4% at end-2014 due to the devaluation of the manat in 1Q15. Fitch views solvency as weak at present given the low core capital ratios and the substantial stock of unreserved high-risk assets.

However, capital ratios could increase by about 2pts by end-2015 as a result of a final planned AZN200m equity injection under the bank's recapitalisation programme. Furthermore, the potential sale of problem exposures may not just lower asset quality risks but also reduce significantly risk-weighted assets.

IBA's 'BB' Long-term Issuer Default Rating and senior debt rating reflect potential support from the Azerbaijan authorities, in case of need, given IBA's high systemic importance, majority (51.1%) state ownership and fairly small size relative to the sovereign's available resources.

However, Fitch views the sovereign's propensity to provide support as only moderate due to the uneven track record of support and weaknesses in the bank's corporate governance.

If the problem asset sale and planned equity contribution result in a marked strengthening of IBA's capitalisation, then Fitch would view this as a significant improvement in the authorities' support track record, which could be positive for the bank's IDRs and senior debt rating. In considering any potential upgrade, Fitch would also take into account the possible impact of IBA's privatisation.

“The sale of the bank would likely be somewhat negative for Fitch's view of the authorities' propensity to provide support. However, we would probably still view the support propensity as high, given IBA's considerable systemic importance, its significant business with the state sector (around AZN1.5bn, or 18% of IBA's end-2014 liabilities, came from state-controlled entities) and the potential for the bank to be sold to new owners who would be closely connected to the local political elite. The fact that IBA's privatisation has been on the agenda for more than a decade without any tangible progress so far also gives rise to significant uncertainty about whether and when a sale will take place.”