Europe’s Asian pivot
By Karl Kaiser and Manuel Muniz
Kaiser is a former director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, an adjunct professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School, and Director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.
Muniz is a DPhil candidate in International Relations at the University of Oxford.
The Obama administration's so-called "pivot to Asia" is the most
important strategic shift that the United States has undertaken
since the end of the Cold War - and it has profound implications
for Europe. But Europe's leaders have largely ignored or
misunderstood its significance, and thus have failed to seize the
opportunity that it represents.
For example, some in Europe believe that America's interest in Asia
is a recent development. But, as President Barack Obama put it in
2011, "The US has been, and always will be, a Pacific nation." The
shift is aimed at ensuring that the US plays "a larger and
long-term role in shaping this region," where it has long helped to
maintain stability and contributed to unprecedented economic
growth. Given this, America's pivot should be viewed more as a
consolidation of established policies than as an abrupt, short-term
change.
The policy's scope is also widely misunderstood. While the policy
does include a rebalancing of America's military posture in Asia -
by 2020, the US Navy will deploy more of its forces, including six
of its 11 carrier groups, to the Pacific Ocean - it covers the
entire spectrum of diplomacy, economics, development, culture, and
inter-societal relations.
This comprehensive approach is evident in Obama's choice of
destination for the first overseas trip of his second term. By
visiting Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia, Obama reinforced earlier
efforts to strengthen diplomatic and economic engagement with the
Asia-Pacific region.
Furthermore, America officially joined the East Asia Summit in
2011, easing concerns in the region about China's increasingly
aggressive posture in the South China Sea. Likewise, America's
proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership and offers of economic
engagement to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries are the latest initiatives underscoring its determination
to strengthen its economic ties in the region.
Such efforts to safeguard regional stability will ultimately
benefit Europe, for which Asia has become an increasingly important
trading partner. Given the rising risk of conflict in Asia - owing
to a toxic combination of rapid GDP growth, an arms race,
historical resentments, rampant chauvinism, territorial disputes,
and a lack of effective institutional arrangements for conflict
resolution - Europe should welcome a stronger US presence in the
region.
At the same time, Europe's leaders must recognize that, by
increasing its engagement in Asia, the US is not turning away from
its European partners. On the contrary, as US Vice President Joe
Biden said in February, Europe remains "the cornerstone of [US]
engagement with the rest of the world."
US leaders are well aware of the geopolitical factors that make
Europe their most important and reliable ally. Its proximity to the
Middle East and Africa - where the European Union and its member
countries are the most important aid donors, trading partners, and
security actors - will ensure the partnership's continued
relevance, as will the common values and deep economic integration
that underpin transatlantic relations.
But the rebalancing does have strategic implications for Europe.
America's military presence in Europe will be gradually reduced, as
will its willingness to take the lead in international crises -
even those affecting Europe's interests. As a result, while the US
will continue to provide intelligence, air support, and ammunition
on a case-by-case basis, as it did recently in Libya and Mali,
Europe will increasingly have to act first and alone.
If Europe is to overcome its current financial constraints and
acquire the military capacity and level of coordination needed to
fulfill its new role, it must pool and share its resources more
effectively. Furthermore, whether on a bilateral basis, through
NATO, or through the EU, France's insistence on military
sovereignty must be reconciled with Germany's culture of excessive
military restraint. Failure to share resources and coordinate
policy would seriously undermine Europe's security interests.
The US rebalancing will also create an opportunity for Europe to
play a greater role in an increasingly important region. By joining
the US in the rebalancing process and supporting relations with
China that are built on cooperation rather than containment, the EU
would contribute to global stability, while spreading European
values. To this end, the EU can leverage its position as a leading
trading partner, investor, and aid donor; it can also contribute at
leaders' summits, such as the Asia-Europe Meeting and the ASEAN
Regional Forum.
The Obama administration seems to understand the potential benefits
of such a "joint rebalancing," with the EU-US statement on the
Asia-Pacific region issued last July suggesting a move toward
policy coordination. But, in pursuing such harmonization, Europeans
should recognize that their Asia strategy - which has so far
focused on commerce and, to a lesser degree, on the rule of law and
human rights - will have to take on a security dimension.
Indeed, if conflicts in Asia become more virulent, Europe cannot
expect the US to shoulder the burden of maintaining regional
stability alone. While this does not necessarily imply a military
role for Europe in Asia (although participation in peacekeeping
missions should not be excluded), it does mean a more forceful
diplomatic posture in support of mediation and multilateralism.
A joint rebalancing would help to fortify all facets of the EU-US
relationship, possibly catalyzing progress on the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership. It would also strengthen the
largest economies' rule-making capacity vis-à-vis the emerging
economies, most notably China, in maintaining a liberal economic
order.
In short, a common approach toward Asia would reinvigorate the
transatlantic relationship at just the right time, and would
guarantee that, despite having suffered from internal disagreements
in the last decade, the EU-US partnership remains the cornerstone
of a peaceful and prosperous world order.
Copyrights: Project Syndicate